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CURBING RENT-SEEKING AND INEFFICIENCY WITH 
BROAD TAKINGS POWERS AND 
UNDERCOMPENSATION: THE CASE OF SINGAPORE 
FROM A GIVINGS PERSPECTIVE 
Jianlin Chen† 
Abstract: Conventional discourses on the perils of weak property rights vis-à-vis 
government takings have failed to account for and respond to the rent-seeking and 
inefficiency problems of government actions.  Singapore, with its broad takings powers, 
coupled with express undercompensation, has not suffered from the predicted widespread 
rent-seeking and inefficiency.  This case study of Singapore from a givings perspective 
demonstrates the importance of imposing a fair charge on the various kinds of givings in 
curbing rent-seeking and inefficiency.  There are also additional benefits of having a 
healthy fiscal budget and more equitable taxation arising from Singapore’s givings 
regime.  The key normative implication is that an equal, if not greater, emphasis has to be 
placed on the givings aspect of the equation, whether in dealing with the problems of 
rent-seeking and inefficiency or promoting better governance and fiscal policies. 
I. Introduction 
The relaxed scope of public use for land in the United States (“U.S.”) 
has resulted in frequent abuses of eminent domain to benefit private parties.1  
These abuses are often regarded as classic examples of rent-seeking whereby 
legislative bodies seek favors from organized interest groups of private 
developers.2  In exchange for money and votes, eminent domain is exercised 
                                           
†
 LL.M. (University of Chicago), Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore), LL.B. (National University of 
Singapore). Currently pursuing J.S.D. at the University of Chicago. The Author is grateful for the 
invaluable guidance from Lisa Bernstein, the insightful comments of Daniel Kelly and Karen Bradshaw, 
and the instrumental legal research and advice on Singapore law by Gan Hui Wen Serene. Nonetheless, all 
errors are mine. 
1
 STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 169-74 (3d ed. 2005) (including discussion of a case 
where eminent domain is exercised pursuant to the private acquirer’s order); David L. Callies, Phoenix 
Rising: The Rebirth of Public Use, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT 49, 50-59 
(Dwight H. Merriam & Marry Massaron Ross eds., 2006) (providing various examples of abuse from 14 
states); Timothy Sanderfur, The “Backlash” so Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain 
Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV 709, 753, 763, 776 (2006) (discussing the abuses in various states); Sara 
B. Falls, Waking a Sleeping Giant: Revisiting the Public Use Debate Twenty-Five Years After Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 355, 356 (2005).  But cf. Rachel D. Godsil & David 
Simunovich, Just Compensation in an Ownership Society, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 134 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) (opining that when seen from 
the perspective of the number of eminent domain per state per year, the approximate forty properties being 
taken or threatened to be taken is not exactly widespread). 
2
 Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning 
Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 547-548 (2006); Daniel B. Kelly, The 
“Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private 
Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2006); Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent 
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for the benefit of these interest groups, unfortunately at the expense of 
individual home owners and other politically weak groups.3  Such perceived 
abuses, as typified by the recent eminent domain case of Kelo v. City of New 
London,4 have prompted the outraged public,5 academics6 and state 
legislatures7 to seek to curtail the scope of eminent domain. 
Undercompensation is also often cited as an important consideration 
during discussion of takings.8   While the provision of “just compensation” is 
sometimes used to justify the taking of property in the United States,9 the 
U.S. “courts have not pretended that fair market value will” compensate for 
all the losses suffered as a consequence of a taking.10  Undercompensation 
can cause inefficiency where the full costs of the takings are not 
internalized.11  Government will be induced to acquire land or impose 
                                                                                                                              
Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 85 (1998); Nicole 
Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 139 (2006); 
Sanderfur, supra note 1, at 770. 
3
 EAGLE, supra note 1, at 22-23; see JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 151 (3d ed. 2008); Benjamin D. Cramer, Eminent 
Domain for Private Development—An Irrational Basis for the Erosion of Property Rights, 55 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 409, 419 (2004); Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1465, 1481 (2008) (Government and private land assemblers have an incentive to overuse eminent domain 
when landowners are politically ineffective). 
4
 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
5
 Sanderfur, supra note 1, at 711; Jennie C. Nolon, Kelo’s Wake: In Search of a Proportional 
Benefit, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 271, 278-279 (2007); Michael Allan Wolf, Hysteria versus History: 
Public Use in the Public Eye, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 
15, 16-22 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) (detailing the media and public backlash against Kelo); CARLA T. 
MAIN, BULLDOZED: “KELO,” EMINENT DOMAIN, AND THE AMERICAN LUST FOR LAND 171-178 (2007) 
(providing a colorful account of the post-Kelo backlash). 
6
 E.g., DON CORACE, GOVERNMENT PIRATES: THE ASSAULT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS—AND 
HOW WE CAN FIGHT IT 1 (2008); ROBERT A. LEVY & WILLIAM MELLOR, THE DIRTY DOZEN: HOW TWELVE 
SUPREME COURT CASES RADICALLY EXPANDED GOVERNMENT AND ERODED FREEDOM 155-168 (2008); 
MAIN, supra note 5 (novelizing the case); Eddie D. Vassallo, Jr., Land Use and Condemnation, in 
INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 3-1, 3-34 (2008) (citing Kelo as another example 
of the erosion of property owner rights); Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle: 
Kelo, Lingle, and Public Discourse about Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613 (2007); Cohen, 
supra note 2; Garnett, supra note 2; Sanderfur, supra note 1.   
7
 ELY supra note 3, at 158 (over 40 states have enacted law to restrict economic development 
eminent domain, with 5 states passing state constitutional amendments to the effect); MAIN, supra note 5, at 
178-83 (describing the political reaction); Wolf, supra note 5, at 23-24; Baron, supra note 6, at 630-31; 
Garnett, supra note 2, at 149; James J. Kelly, Jr., “We Shall Not be Moved”: Urban Communities, Eminent 
Domain and the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 923, 926 (2006); Sanderfur, 
supra note 1, at 712. 
8
 Cohen, supra note 2, at 536-40; Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and 
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 899, 926 (2007); Garnett, supra note 2, at 104; 
Heller & Hills, supra note 3, at 1475-76. 
9
 Cohen, supra note 2, at 536. 
10
 EAGLE, supra note 1, at 189-90; Kelly, supra note 7, at 940.   
11
 YIFAT HOLZMAN-GAZIT, LAND EXPROPRIATION IN ISRAEL: LAW, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 19 
(2007); Cohen, supra note 2, at 541-42; Eagle, supra note 8, at 926; Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for 
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regulatory burdens excessively despite the presence of socially cheaper 
alternatives that may cost more to the government.12 
Given the scholarly discourse that focuses on restricting the scope of 
eminent domain to prevent rent-seeking by private parties and ensuring 
proper compensation to promote government efficiency, one would naturally 
shudder at the thought of a regime expressly allowing eminent domain in 
order to transfer property to private parties coupled with below-market 
compensation.  If such a regime exists, it surely has to be saddled with 
widespread rent-seeking and inefficiency.   
Such a regime does exist in Singapore.  Not only is protection of 
private property rights absent from Singapore’s Constitution,13 the 
government has wide eminent domain power14 which is coupled with legally 
stipulated below-market compensation.15  There is also no regulatory takings 
doctrine protecting owners from non-physical invasion of property.16  Yet 
despite this blatant lack of private property protection from government 
takings, Singapore has not suffered from the predicted widespread rent-
seeking and inefficiency.  Rent-seeking is a form of corruption.17  Echoing 
the rent-seeking problem of broad eminent domain powers, preliminary 
empirical evidence suggests that the quality of national property rights 
arrangements may be an important institutional determinant of national 
corruption levels.18  Indeed, the “evil associated with use of the power of 
eminent domain for private benefit is the possibility of corruption that 
                                                                                                                              
Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1634 (2006); 
Heller & Hills, supra note 3, at 1481. 
12
 EAGLE, supra note 1, at 187-88; Chenglin Liu, The Chinese Takings Law from a Comparative 
Perspective, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 301, 303 (2008) (“Substantial costs effectively force the 
government to search for other alternative means to complete its projects”). 
13
 See Sing. Const. (1999) (noting in particular the conspicuous absence of property rights protection 
under “Part IV Fundamental Liberties”); see infra Part II. 
14
  See Land Acquisition Act, c. 152, § 5(1)(a)-(c) (1985) (amended 2007) (Sing.) (providing in part 
that land may be acquired if it is needed 1) for any public purpose, 2) by any person for any work which in 
the opinion of the Minister is of public benefit, public utility or in the public interest or 3) for any 
residential, commercial or industrial purposes; moreover, section 5(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 
stipulates that notification for eminent domain shall be conclusive evidence that the purpose requirement 
has been satisfied); infra Part II.A. 
15
  Compensation is calculated as the value of the property on either the date of notification of 
preliminary inquiry (if the actual acquisition declaration is within 6 months of this date), the actual date of 
acquisition declaration, or certain previously legislative stipulated date, whichever is lowest.  Land 
Acquisition Act, c. 152, § 33(1)(i)-(iii) (1985) (amended 2005) (Sing.).   
16
  Infra Part II.C. 
17
  Howard Dick, Why Law Reform Fails – Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Reforms, in LAW REFORM IN 
DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES 42, 46 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2007).  
18
  Sonja Opper, Inefficient Property Rights and Corruption – The Case of Accounting Fraud in 
China, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 198, 198, 203 (Johann Graf Lambsdorff et 
al. eds., 2005). 
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inevitably follows.”19  Yet Singapore is one of the least corrupt nations in the 
world and has a much lower corruption rating than the United States.20  
Singapore has also done well in various international studies measuring 
government efficiency and effectiveness.21  While these studies inevitably 
have their own limitations and are far from conclusive,22 the consistent high 
scores by Singapore do strongly suggest that the traditional discourse on the 
perils of weak property rights vis-à-vis government takings is not telling the 
whole story.  
This paper utilizes the givings perspective23 to argue that the focus on 
private property protection in tackling rent-seeking and inefficiency is both 
misplaced and incomplete. There are major deficiencies in merely focusing 
on the takings aspect.  Restricting a government’s eminent domain does little 
to curtail rent-seeking since there is still plenty of rent to be sought due to 
dishing out of benefits and wealth by the government.24  Inefficiency will 
not be avoided even if all the social costs are internalized through adequate 
compensation.25  Governments may still fail to undertake costly but socially 
beneficial projects due to the inability to pay for the projects without 
internalization of social benefits.  As the givings jurisprudence dictates, 
ensuring that the government extracts a fair charge from the recipients of the 
government’s benefits would be more effective in tackling the root of the 
rent-seeking and inefficiency problem.  
Indeed, what Singapore lacks in private property protection is 
compensated by a rigorous zeal in charging for government benefits that 
                                           
19
 EAGLE, supra note 1, at 154. 
20
 In a worldwide survey of 163 countries, Singapore comes in 5th with a score of 9.4 (scores range 
from 10 being highly transparent and 0 being highly corrupt), the U.S. comes in 20th with a score of 7.3.  
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 21 (Amber Poroznuk ed., 2006). 
21
 See infra Part III.B.2.  These are mainly studies of national governance.  Singapore is usually 
among the top nations in areas such as “government effectiveness”, “regulatory quality” and “government 
efficiency.”  Singapore has also typically outranked the U.S. in these areas. 
22
 See infra Part III.B.3.  The main limitations are indeterminate correlation (whether the broad-
based corruption rating correlate to corruption and rent-seeking from government’s eminent domain action) 
and presence of other contributing factors that may mask the deficiency in takings law. 
23
 The flipside of takings jurisprudence, the givings jurisprudence focuses on the giving aspect of the 
equation and advocate that the beneficiary of a government’s actions should pay for the benefits received.  
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).  For other applications of 
the givings jurisprudence see Lindsay Warren Bowen Jr., Givings and the Next Copyright Deferment, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 809 (2008); Jianlin Chen, China’s Ding Zi Hu, the United States’s Kelo, and 
Singapore’s En-bloc Process: A New Model for Economic Development Eminent Domain from a Givings 
Perspective, 28 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 107 (2008); Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Jian-Lin Chen, 
Bargaining for Compensation in the Shadow of Regulatory Giving: The Case of Stock Trading Rights 
Reform in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 298 (2006). 
24
 Infra Part IV.A.1. 
25
 Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Market, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 350 (2000); see infra Part IV.A.2. 
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either minimize the amount of rent available in traditional hot-beds of 
corruption (e.g. land-use zoning, regulatory permits, etc.) or internalize 
social benefits in projects which would otherwise be too costly for the 
government to undertake.  The case study of Singapore’s application of 
givings reveals that this is not only effective in curtailing rent-seeking and 
promoting efficiency but also produces other important benefits like a 
healthier government budget and an equitable tax regime.26  The key 
normative implication is that an equal, if not greater, emphasis has to be 
placed on the givings aspect of the equation, whether in dealing with the 
problems of rent-seeking and inefficiency or promoting better governance 
and fiscal policies.  
Yet the Singapore regime is far from perfect.  In particular, the lack of 
legal restraints and enforcement mechanisms renders the givings policies 
and practices vulnerable to any changes in political conditions.  This paper 
proposes a framework for implementing givings reforms that tackles this 
deficiency together with other pertinent issues like evaluation and public 
purpose.  As countries all around the world embark on government givings 
in the form of massive economic stimulus spending budgets,27 this 
framework provides a timely analytical structure in ensuring that stimulus 
plans are not marred by inefficiency and rent-seeking. 
It is important to clarify that this paper is not suggesting that property 
rights protection from government takings is not important or should be 
neglected.  There are many arguments related to the other benefits of 
property rights, such as the protection of liberty, political stability, and 
economic prosperity,28 or even the rule of law.29  These are neither the 
                                           
26
  Infra part VI. 
27
  David M. Herszenhorn, A Smaller, Faster Stimulus Plan, but Still with a Lot of Money, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A14 (reporting a $787 billion stimulus budget for the U.S.); Zakir Hussain, Budget 
a “Decisive” one for Tough Times, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 28, 2009 (noting that the Singapore 
stimulus budget is 8% of the GDP.  The U.S. stimulus budget is about 6% and Germany’s is about 1% 
while Taiwan’s is about 4% over 4 years). 
28
  Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317 (1988).  See also TERRY L. 
ANDERSON & LAURA E. HUGGINS, PROPERTY RIGHTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FREEDOM & PROSPERITY 29 
(2003) (“When clearly specified property rights exist in the context of rule of law, resources are better 
cared for, economic prosperity is more likely, and freedom prevails.”); Dick, supra note 17, at 43 
(“Without clear specification of property rights and the means to protect those rights against arbitrary 
seizure or encroachment by the state or associated interests, as also by opportunistic private interests, 
business faces high risks and high uncertainty and will be reluctant to invest.”); FRANK J. POPPER, THE 
POLITICS OF LAND-USE REFORM 9 (1981) (“Ownership of land implies power, security, independence, 
fertility, and, above all, wealth.”); POLLY J. PRICE, PROPERTY RIGHTS: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE 
LAW 3-4 (2003) (Property as the “guardian of every other right”); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of 
Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 152 (1987) (“Ill-defined 
property rights lead to legislative intrigue, political favoritism, and massive uncertainty, all of which tend to 
reduce the levels of both liberty and utility.”). 
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subject of this paper nor are they arguments with which the author 
necessarily disagrees.  However, if discouraging rent-seeking and 
inefficiency are the chief concerns driving the takings discourse, then this 
paper argues that looking at the giving aspect is necessary for a more 
complete and effective approach to the problem. 
Part II examines the lack of property rights protection from 
government takings in Singapore.  This part explores the various aspects of 
government takings in Singapore, including the wide scope of eminent 
domain, the low quantum of compensation, the lack of regulatory takings 
doctrine and the en-bloc process that allows private developers to 
compulsorily acquire property directly from owners not wishing to sell their 
property.  Part III discusses the conventional takings discourse which 
envisages the serious problems of rent-seeking and inefficiency arising from 
such weak property rights protection.  This literature review is then 
contrasted with the various international surveys and empirical studies that 
strongly suggest Singapore has not suffered from the predicted rent-seeking 
and inefficiency.  
Part IV critically examines the deficiencies of the conventional 
takings discourse.  In particular, asserting that even the most stringent 
takings laws cannot adequately deal with the problems of rent-seeking and 
inefficiency.  The key idea is that equal emphasis has to be placed on the 
givings aspect of the equation and ensuring that beneficiaries of government 
actions are properly charged for the benefits received.    
With this theoretical framework, Part V looks at how Singapore 
imposes charges on the beneficiaries of government actions for all three 
types of givings:  physical, regulatory and derivative.30  Two examples are 
provided for each type of givings to illustrate the manner in which charges 
are imposed.  Important examples include stringent procedures in the 
disposal of government assets and allocation of government contracts;31 
development charges which are calculated based on the increase in land 
                                                                                                                              
29
 Curtis J. Milhaupt, Response, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1170 (1998); J. 
Peter Byrne, What We Talk about when We Talk about Property Rights – A Response to Carol Rose’s 
Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1058 (1996) (“Respect for property rights 
by both individuals and officials reflects the rule of law, and that, indeed, is the guardian of every other 
right”). 
30
 A physical giving is a direct transfer of wealth and/or property by the government to the private 
individual.  A regulatory giving is where the value of the private individual’s property has been enhanced 
by a government regulation affecting that property.  A derivative giving occurs when the value of the 
private individual’s property is increased by government actions nor directly affecting the property.  Bell & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 23, at 551.  See also, infra Part V.  
31
 Infra Part V.A.1. 
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value arising from the development permit;32 a special tax imposed on hotels 
that are situated along the designated route of the Formula One (“F1”) street 
race on account of the huge benefits to the hotels from the increased demand 
in rooms,33 among others.  Where applicable, a comparison with the U.S. 
and other nations’ doctrines is made to highlight the givings rationale driving 
Singapore laws and policies.   
Based on these examples, Part VI analyzes the merits of Singapore’s 
charging of government givings.  The case study of Singapore not only 
confirms the benefits of social efficiency and reduced rent-seeking but also 
injects a new insight into how transactional cost implications reinforce the 
curtailing effect of charging givings on rent-seeking.  In addition, 
Singapore’s application of its eminent domain powers illustrates how a 
regime that charges givings can produce other important benefits not 
envisaged by the current givings jurisprudence.  These include a healthier 
government budget and a more equitable form of taxation. 
Part VII critiques the Singapore givings regime.  The deficiencies of 
the Singapore regime, the lack of legal restraints and enforcement 
mechanisms are addressed along with other import issues such as the 
proposed framework for implementing givings reform.  Part VIII concludes 
with comments on the unfolding stimulus budgets. 
II. Limited Property Rights Protection in Singapore 
Measuring the level of property rights protection usually includes the 
possibility of private property being expropriated by the government: the 
greater the chances of government expropriation of property, the lower the 
level of property rights protection.34  The core constitutional protections for 
property focus on restricting governments from taking private property 
without compensation.35  Indeed, the biggest threat to private property rights 
is often the state itself.36  
                                           
32
  Infra Part V.B.1. 
33
  Infra Part V.C.2. 
34
  PRICE, supra note 28, at 4 (“It is useful to compare constitutional protection of private property in 
the United States with the experience of some other nations... [where there have been] several instances of 
government appropriation and redistribution of private property without compensation to the owners.”); 
Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us about Rule of Law Reforms, 26 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 141, 152 (2004).  
35
  Andrzej Rapaczynski, Can Constitutions Protect Private Property Against Governmental 
Predation?, in THE EGLAR COMPANION TO THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 197, 210 (Enrico 
Colmbatto ed., 2004). 
36
  Andrezj Rapaczynski, The Roles of the State and the Market in Establish Property Rights, 10 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 87, 92 n. 2 (1996).  See also CORACE, supra note 6, at 1-6. 
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Singapore does not have private property rights enumerated in its 
Constitution.37  The pre-1965 Federal Constitution that applied to Singapore 
included Article 13(1), which enshrined the constitutional right to property 
and the payment of fair compensation for property acquisition.  However, 
the clause was deliberately left out when Singapore drafted its own 
Constitution after gaining independence in 1965.38  This in itself is not 
entirely unusual since there are advanced democracies like Canada, India 
and New Zealand that do not have a property clause in their written 
constitutions or bills of rights.39  However, such rejection of constitutional 
property rights is usually premised on grounds that individual property rights 
are undemocratic or that they entrench wealth inequality.40  This is very 
different from Singapore where the clause was excluded to expressly avoid 
litigation on the adequacy of compensation.41   
Indeed, the presence of the now rejected Article 13(1) had thwarted a 
previous attempt in the early sixties to pass a similarly worded predecessor 
of the Land Acquisition Act.42  The Land Acquisition Act43 has been the 
governing law on eminent domain in Singapore since 1965.  It provides for a 
scope of eminent domain and amount of compensation that would appear 
outrageous for U.S. observers who have already heavily chastised the Kelo 
decision.44  The lack of constitutional protection in Singapore has also 
curtailed the development of a regulatory takings doctrine and facilitated a 
private taking scheme known as the en-bloc process.  
A. Wide Scope of Land Acquisition 
The government’s power in eminent domain is very broad.  Land may 
be acquired if it is needed:  1) for any public purpose, 2) by any person for 
                                           
37
 See Sing. Const. (1999) (noting in particular the conspicuous absence of property rights protection 
under “Part IV Fundamental Liberties”). 
38
 N KHUBLALL, COMPULSORY LAND ACQUISITION SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA 20 (2d ed. 1994); 
William J. M. Ricquier, Compulsory Purchase in Singapore, in TAKING LAND: COMPULSORY PURCHASE 
AND REGULATION IN ASIAN-PACIFIC COUNTRIES 263, 268 (Tsuyoshi Kotaka & David L. Callies eds., 
2002); Kevin YL Tan, Fifty Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Singapore Reflection, 
20 SING. L.R. 239, 258 (1999).  
39
 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:  LESSONS FOR 
AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 23 (2006). 
40
 In Canada’s case, the reasons for rejecting a constitutional property clause are the democratic 
rationale and federalism.  Id. at 30-35, 47.  For India, the rationales are more titled towards wealth 
redistribution and an underlying political struggle between the legislature and an activist judiciary.  Id. at 
49-57. 
41
  KHUBLALL, supra note 38, at 20; Chenglin Liu, supra note 12, at 337-38. 
42
  KHUBLALL, supra note 38, at 10-11. 
43
  Discussion in notes, supra note 14. 
44
  See discussion in notes, supra note 6. 
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any work which, in the opinion of the Minister, is of public benefit, public 
utility or in the public interest, or 3) for any residential, commercial or 
industrial purposes.45  Under these broad definitions (especially the third 
factor), the government can acquire land from its owners for resale to a 
private developer.  Because private development is beneficial to the 
community, such acquisitions may not be held up by obstructive owners.46  
There are numerous examples where land was acquired for private 
development.47  
Moreover, the notification for eminent domain is conclusive evidence 
that the purpose requirement has been satisfied.48  Given the extreme 
scarcity of land in Singapore and the public benefits gained from takings, 
courts are highly deferential to government authorities.  Nonetheless, the 
courts “must – and will – step in” when there is bad faith, notwithstanding 
the clear language of section 5(3).49  The courts have suggested that if the 
land had been acquired for resale without more (e.g. without a development 
plan), government action is likely to constitute bad faith.50  However, there 
has been no reported case to date that has successfully challenged the 
government on this ground.51  Indeed, the court has observed that the 
legislature intended “public purpose” to be very broad and that it “might 
conceivably include the acquisition of land for resale to private 
developers.”52 
                                           
45
 Land Acquisition Act, c.152, §5(1)(i)-(iii) (1985) (Sing.).   
46
  T.T.B. Koh & William S.W. Lim, Planning Law and Processes in Singapore, 11 MALAYA L. REV. 
315, 333-34 (1969). 
47
  Basco Enter. Pte. Ltd. v. Soh Siong Wai, 1989-1 Sing. L. Rep. (Sing. C.A.) (building was acquired 
with façade preserved while interior is sold via open public tender for retail outlets); Joanne Lee, Dawson 
Estate to Make Way for Redevelopment, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Mar. 5, 1999, at 45; Ann Williams, Tiong 
Bahru Flats First in Redevelopment Scheme, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 23, 1995, at 1; Chew Xiang, 
Temple’s Acquisition Appeal Dismissed, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), Feb. 26, 2008 (a temple was acquired in 
conjunction with the construction of a mass transit line and set to be resold for high-density residential 
development). 
48
 Land Acquisition Act, c.152, §5(3) (1985) (Sing). 
49
 Teng Fuh Holdings v. Collector of Land Revenue, 2006-3 Sing. L. Rep. 507, 523-24 (Sing. High 
Ct.).  
50
 Id. at 526; Ng Boo Tan v. Collector of Land Revenue, 2002-4 Sing. L. Rep. 495, 513 (Sing. C.A.). 
51
 Based on the author’s searches using LEXIS NEXIS and Lawnet (Sing.).  See also Chenglin Liu, 
supra note 12, at 338-40.  Liu’s view on the “unchallengeable nature of public purpose doctrine in 
Singaporean Law” is probably overstated, especially in light of later cases like Ng Boo Tan, 2002-4 Sing. 
L. Rep. at 513, which reaffirmed the court’s power of judicial review.  Nonetheless, the author agrees that it 
is extremely difficult to succeed on this ground in Singapore.  
52
  Teng Fuh Holdings, 2006-3 Sing. L. Rep. at 531. 
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B. The Quantum of Compensation 
To make matters worse, the compensation under the Singapore takings 
regime appears grossly insufficient.  Prior to the most recent 2007 
amendments, market value was clearly not awarded.53  Compensation was 
calculated as the value of the property on either the date of notification of 
preliminary inquiry,54 the actual date of acquisition declaration, or a 
legislatively stipulated date, whichever is lowest.55  The legislatively 
stipulated date has been revised periodically,56 but there were often 
substantial shortfalls, especially during property booms.57 
This clause can cause substantial hardship.  In a litigated case where a 
building was acquired in 1985, the compensation awarded was based on the 
market value of the legislatively stipulated date of 1973.58  The award 
amount of S$260,000 was far less than the 1985 market value of 
S$670,000.59  Indeed, given the general trend of increasing property prices in 
land scarce and densely populated Singapore,60 compensation is likely to be 
based on the lower value assessed at a prior date. 
Moreover, the value of property is determined by the price that a bona 
fide purchaser might reasonably be expected to pay for the land on the basis 
of either its existing use or the purpose designated by post-acquisition 
zoning, again whichever is the lower figure.61  Potential value from any 
possible more intensive use of the land is also not taken into account.62  This 
is even harsher than the U.S. takings law that merely precludes including the 
                                           
53
 Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, Bill [5/2007] (2007) (Sing.), available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/Publications/070005.pdf.  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2007, 
Parliament No. 11 Hansard (Sing.) 11 Apr. 2007, Col 500 (testimony Deputy Prime Minister and Minster 
for Law, Prof. S Jayakumar) (as acknowledged by legislature). 
54
 This is a notice indicating the land is likely to be acquired.  It grants the government the right to 
survey the land for the purpose of determining whether acquisition is, indeed, required.  For this date to be 
taken into account, the actual date of acquisition declaration has to be within six months.  See Land 
Acquisition Act, c. 152, §3 (1985) (Sing.).  
55
  Land Acquisition Act, c. 152, §33(1)(a)(i)-(iii) (1985) (Sing.). 
56
  Ricquier, supra note 38, at 272-273 (The act was amended in 1973, 1986, 1992, 1995); Ann 
Williams, Big Drop in Land Acquired by Govt in Last Decade, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Oct. 9, 1995, at 48.  
57
  Ricquier, supra note 38, at 272-73. 
58
  Collector of Land Revenue v. Ang Thian Soo, 1990-1 Sing. L. Rep. 11, 13, 19 (Sing. C.A.). 
59
  Id. 
60
  Land area of only 704 square kilometers with a population density of 6369 people per square 
kilometer.  SINGAPORE DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, YEARBOOK OF STATISTICS SINGAPORE 2007 9 (2007) 
[hereinafter 2007 YEARBOOK OF STATISTICS SINGAPORE]. 
61
 Land Acquisition Act, c. 152, §33(5)(e) (1985) (Sing.).  
62
 Id. §33(5)(e). 
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potential rise in land value from development in the compensation amount.63  
In Singapore, the property owner may actually be penalized with less 
compensation simply because the acquired land is down-zoned for the 
purpose of acquisition (e.g. to build a park that has less commercial value 
than the original residential zoning).  Indeed, a property owner whose 
property was compulsorily acquired in 1998 was not compensated for the 
decrease in value caused by the scheme leading to the acquisition.64  This is 
notwithstanding the fact that the depreciation of value arose from the 
announcement of a proposed road cutting through the acquired property.65  
The court specifically held that “no elements of any loss of value caused by 
the process of acquisition need to be artificially compensated for.”66 
Furthermore, there is a deduction in the increase in value of the 
property owner’s remaining land by virtue of the use to which the acquired 
land will be put.67  In a land acquisition exercise for the construction of a 
mass transit station, the government acquired a small plot of land originally 
used as a car park on private residential property.  A nominal S$1 was paid 
as compensation since the gains in the property value from the eventual 
construction of the mass transit station (estimated by industry sources to be 
some $18,000,000) are much more than the value of the 220 square meters 
of land acquired.68  
In addition, value of land increased by virtue of provision of public 
utilities and facilities over the past seven years will be discounted.69  Private 
improvement within the past two years will also be disregarded unless it is 
shown to be made in good faith and not in contemplation of land acquisition 
proceedings.70  The possible saving grace is that compensation can take into 
account relocation costs71 and any damage to the property as a result of the 
acquisition.72 
                                           
63
  Cohen, supra note 2, at 539; Heller & Hills, supra note 3, at 1477 (“The Supreme Court has held 
that landowners do not deserve to receive a windfall from the beneficial activities of government simply 
because their land stands in the path of progress”). 
64
  Ng Boo Tan, 2002-4 Sing. L. Rep. at 495.  
65
  Id. at 499. 
66
  Id. at 514. For a critique of the case, see generally Tan Sook Yee, Is There any Pointe?, 2003 
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 262 (2003). 
67
  Land Acquisition Act, c. 152, §33(1)(b) (1985) (Sing.). 
68
  Mary Ann Mendis, More Payment if Property Values Hit, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), July 2, 2003 
(220 square meters amounts to 0.6 percent of the total residential property area).  
69
  Land Acquisition Act, c. 152, §33(5)(c) (1985) (Sing.) (broadly defining that the development 
need not be commenced by the government, “development in the neighborhood by the provision of roads, 
drains, electricity, water, gas or sewerage or social, educational or recreational facilities within 7 years”). 
70
  Id. §33(5)(a). 
71
  Id. §33(1)(e). 
72
  Id. §33(1)(d). 
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C. No Regulatory Takings 
The regulatory takings doctrine in the U.S.73 provides some relief for 
property owner whose property is negatively affected by government 
regulations.  As clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle v. Chevron,74 
two relatively narrow categories of regulatory actions will generally be 
deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes, namely permanent 
physical invasion, however minor, and complete deprivation of all 
economically beneficial use of property.75  Outside these two categories, the 
courts will adopt the approach in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York 
City,76 and look into several factors, primarily focusing on “the economic 
impact of the regulation of the claimant, and particularly, the extent to which 
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”77  
This doctrine has been criticized by scholars for not adequately protecting 
property owners from the real threat of government regulations.78  
Furthermore, expropriation of foreign investors’ property by the state often 
manifests through government regulatory actions and seldom as direct 
expropriation.79   
Yet, the property owners in Singapore are deprived of even this 
limited form of protection.  It is not surprising that courts do not extend 
protection from non-physical invasions of property, since there is no 
constitutional protection of private property.80  There have been no reported 
cases in Singapore where compensation is mandated for diminution of 
property value by regulation.81  
                                           
73
 For a historical account of the development of the regulatory takings doctrine in the U.S. from the 
property rights movement see ALFRED M. OLIVETTI, JR. & JEFF WORSHAM, THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND, THIS 
LAND IS MY LANd (Eric Rise ed., 2003).  See generally EAGLE, supra note 1. 
74
 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
75
 Id. at 528. 
76
 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
77
 Id. at 124. 
78
  EAGLE, supra note 1, at 716-17 (though there is a recent resurgence in property rights protection in 
the regulatory taking arena); ELY, supra note 3, at 165 (“individuals face significant handicaps in pursuing 
regulatory takings claims”). 
79
 KAJ HOBER, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF A DEFINITION OF 
EXPROPRIATION 221 (2007) (looking at investment disputes involving Eastern European states). 
80
  The Fifth Amendment which the rich US jurisprudence of regulatory takings was founded upon is 
not particularly explicit on the matter.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”); see discussion in notes, supra note 13. 
81
 TAKING LAND: COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND REGULATION IN ASIAN-PACIFIC COUNTRIES 4 
(Tsuyoshi Kotaka & David L. Callies eds., 2002) (in a survey of Asian Pacific nations, only Japan and 
Korea had theories akin to “regulatory takings”).  Searches by the author have also failed to uncover any 
cases.  
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D. En-Bloc Process 
The lack of constitutional protection for private property rights has 
been used by legislators to justify a novel scheme involving granting 
eminent domain powers to private developers, otherwise known as the en-
bloc process.82  Under the en-bloc process, private developers purchasing a 
strata-title development (i.e., a flat or condominium) may compel owners 
who objected to the sale to transfer the property if a certain percentage of the 
majority83 of owners in the strata-title development has agreed to the sale.  
The legislative rationale was to facilitate the realization of the land’s full 
development potential and to allow rejuvenation of urban development.84  
During legislative discussions, there were concerns about property rights,85 
minority owners not being adequately compensated (e.g., subjective value 
and relocation costs),86 and the fact that property owners were compelled to 
sell their property for economic purposes instead of traditional public 
interests like infrastructure construction.87  However, the public interest 
element in en-bloc sale, namely the need for redevelopment in land-scarce 
Singapore, was ultimately compelling enough to override these concerns.88 
Notwithstanding the necessity and merits of this arrangement,89 the 
grant of eminent domain powers to private developers in such direct manner 
certainly makes Kelo look like an angel.90   
                                           
82
 Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 1998, Parliament No. 9 Hansard (Sing.) 31 July 1998, Col 
623 (testimony of Mr. Shriniwas Rai).  See generally Jianlin Chen, supra note 23, at 132-42.  
83
 Either eighty percent or ninety percent majority depending on the age of the property.  Land Titles 
(Strata) Act, Cap. 158, §84A(1) (1999) (Sing.). 
84
 Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 1998, supra note 82, at Col 601 (testimony of Minister of 
State for Law, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee). 
85
 E.g., Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 1998, supra note 82, at Col 60 (testimony of 
Associate Professor Chin Tet Yung); id. at Col 626 (testimony of Mr. Simon S.C.SC Tay). 
86
 E.g., Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 1998, supra note 82, at Col 609 (testimony of 
Associate Professor Chin Tet Yung); id. at Col 617 (testimony of Mr. Zulkifli Bin Baharudin); id. at Col 
626 (testimony of Mr. Simon S.C.SC Tay); id. at Cols 615-16 (testimony of Mr. Chuang Shaw Peng). 
87
 Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 1998, supra note 82, at Col 608 (testimony of Associate 
Professor Chin Tet Yung); Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, (as reported from Select Committee), 
1999, Parliament No. 9, Sess. No. 1, Vol. No. 70, Sitting No. 12, Col 1336 (1999) (Sing.) (testimony of Mr. 
Simon Tay). 
88
 Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 1998, supra note 82, at Col 632 (testimony of Minister of 
State for Law, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee).  See Jianlin Chen, supra note 23, at 133-34. 
89
 See Jianlin Chen, supra note 23, at 142-50.  Arguments include the superior economic judgment 
of private developers compared to legislators, better internalization of cost and reduction of rent-seeking, 
better compensation for owners of acquired property, an efficient hybrid property-liability rule under 
economic analysis and a more structured and transparent process.  See also Heller & Hills, supra note 3 
(proposing a land assembly districts mechanism which is similar to the en-bloc process where private 
developers can compulsory acquire the property upon the approval of a majority of the property owner). 
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III. The Singapore Paradox: Where is the Rent-Seeking and Inefficiency? 
A. Deficiencies of the Singapore Regime under Conventional Takings 
Discourse 
The above account highlights the precarious nature of property rights 
in Singapore vis-à-vis government takings.  In particular, the wide scope of 
eminent domain powers and clear undercompensation is decisively frowned 
upon by conventional takings discourse.  Academics commonly focus on the 
problems of rent-seeking and inefficiency when criticizing such wide 
eminent domain powers and undercompensation. 
1. Rent-seeking and Corruption 
The broad eminent domain powers and deference to legislature by the 
Singapore courts theoretically provide ample room for rent-seeking and 
corruption.  The wide scope of the Singapore eminent domain powers 
presents a real possibility of misuse in favor of certain individuals without at 
the same time conferring any public benefit.91  As Justice O’Connor stated in 
her dissenting opinion in Kelo, these individuals are “likely to be those 
citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, 
including large corporations and development firms.”92 
According to public choice theory, a mobilized, well-connected 
minority can exert more political influence than a numerically superior but 
unorganized or apathetic majority.93  Public choice theory challenges the 
notion that persons working for administrative agencies are able to actively 
and single-mindedly pursue the public interest without being affected by 
their own self-interest.94  Rent seeking in the political process provides an 
incentive for legislative bodies to seek favor from organized interest groups 
in order to raise money and gain votes, unfortunately at the expense of 
                                                                                                                              
90
 Kelo suggests a test for clarifying the differences between valid public uses and private takings.  
David Schultz, What’s Yours Can be Mine: Are There Any Private Takings After Kelo v. City of New 
London, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. 195, 234 (2006). 
91
  KHUBLALL, supra note 38, at 42. 
92
  545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  See also Kochan, supra note 2, at 52 
(beneficiaries of a relaxed public use standard are often powerful and wealthy special interests capable of 
exercising significant influence on the government). 
93
  Serkin, supra note 11, at 1637; EAGLE, supra note 1, at 22. 
94
 John A. Rogovin & Rodger D. Citron, Lessons from the Nextwave Saga: The Federal 
Communications Commission, the Courts and the Use of Market Forms to Perform Public Functions, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 695 (2005); Richard E. Wagner, User Fees and Earmarked Taxes in Constitutional 
Perspective, in CHARGING FOR GOVERNMENT: USER CHARGES AND EARMARKED TAXES IN PRINCIPLE AND 
PRACTICE 179-88 (Richard E. Wagner ed., 1991). 
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individual homeowners and other politically weak groups.95  The relaxed 
scope of public use in the U.S. has resulted in frequent abuses of eminent 
domain to benefit private parties.96  There are even instances where 
municipal governments seem to favor a particular competitor.97  The 
redistributive nature of such rent-seeking behavior is not only immoral but is 
also unproductive and inefficient.98  
The wide scope of eminent domain “encourages the wealthy and 
powerful to arrogate that power to themselves.”99  Indeed, one of the “evil[s] 
associated with use of the power of eminent domain for private benefit is the 
possibility of corruption that inevitably follows.”100  Stronger property rights 
are also often hailed as the solution for corruption.  There are economists 
and officials who expect and hope that strengthening constitutional 
protections of private property (i.e. tightening of the use and/or increasing 
compensation) will lead to a decline in government abuses.101  The 
libertarians treat Kelo as evidence of the perils of “faction and rent-seeking 
that only a strong system of property rights can effectively resist.”102  Nobel 
Prize laureate Gary Becker argues that “the authority to seize property by 
eminent domain opens the door to inefficient projects born of corruption and 
enabled by abusive exercise of government powers.”103  Some commentators 
conclude that “the absence of secure property rights is the cause of 
corruption, and the creation of private property rights would be the cure for 
corruption.”104  The broad takings powers in Singapore, including the 
absence of regulatory takings doctrine, are certainly conducive for 
exploitation and rent-seeking for private benefits.   
                                           
95
  See all in supra note 3. 
96
  See all in supra note 1. 
97
  EAGLE, supra note 1, at 171-74 (favoring Costco Wholesale Corporation over 99 Cents Only 
Store); Cramer, supra note 3, at 416-17 (favoring BMW dealership over Mitsubishi dealership); Falls, 
supra note 1, at 364 (favoring BMW dealership over Mitsubishi dealership); id. at 365 (favoring Costco 
Wholesale Corporation over 99 Cents Only Store). 
98
  Kochan, supra note 2, at 83; Eagle, supra note 8, at 928. 
99
  Patricia E. Salkin et al., The Friends of the Court: The Role of Amicus Curiae in Kelo v. City of 
New London, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT 165, 170 (Dwight H. Merriam & 
Marry Massaron Ross eds., 2006) (quoting the amicus curiae of the Better Government Association in the 
Kelo case). 
100
  EAGLE, supra note 1, at 154. 
101
  Rapaczynski, supra note 35, at 215. 
102
  Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1412, 1423 (2006) (citing Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original: of Grubby Particulars and 
Grand Principles, 8 GREEN BAG 2d. 335, 357 (2005)). 
103
  Id. at 1415. 
104
  Gerald P. O’Driscoll & Lee Hoskins, Property Rights: The Key to Economic Development, 482 
CATO INSTITUTE, Aug. 7, 2003, available at http://www.cato.org/pub_cat_display.php?pub_cat=2&page=2, 
File No. 482. 
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2. Undercompensation and Inefficiency 
Undercompensation is often cited as an important consideration in the 
eminent domain process.105  “Compensation is a key restraint . . . as it 
requires government to think about the costs and benefits of a project and to 
allocate resources to the undertaking.”106  Undercompensation will cause 
inefficiency where the full costs of the takings are not internalized.107  
Government will be induced to acquire land or impose excessive regulatory 
burdens despite the presence of socially cheaper alternatives because those 
alternatives may cost the government more.108  Economists caution that 
extensive use of eminent domain leads to inefficient government projects.109  
This is borne out in Israel where the law provides for far-reaching powers of 
expropriation without compensation.110  This ability to acquire land for free 
has indeed resulted in inefficient eminent domain.  A recent study found that 
local governments acquired land to construct redundant schools when 
existing schools were suffering from poor maintenance.111  
While the provision of “just compensation” is sometimes used to 
justify takings,112 U.S. courts have not pretended that fair market value will 
compensate for all the losses suffered as a consequence of a taking.113  Even 
if fair market value is given, there is still undercompensation because 
relocation expenses, goodwill associated with a business’s location, and the 
cost of replacing the condemned property, are not factored in the fair market 
value.114  There may be surpluses from an owner’s singular appreciation 
from his property, some being so idiosyncratic as to be intelligible while 
others may be reflective of unique needs (e.g., wheelchair-bound owners 
                                           
105
  See Eagle, supra note 8. 
106
  Robin Paul Malloy & James Charles Smith, Private Property, Community Development, and 
Eminent Domain, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 1, 8 (Robin 
Paul Malloy ed., 2008). 
107
  Cohen, supra note 2, at 541-42; Serkin, supra note 11, at 1634; Eagle, supra note 8, at 926; 
HOLZMAN-GAZIT, supra note 11, at 19; Heller & Hills, supra note 3, at 1481. 
108
  EAGLE, supra note 1, at 188 n.1102; Chenglin Liu, supra note 12, at 303 (“Substantial costs 
effectively force the government to search for other alternative means to complete its projects . . . .”). 
109
  Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 102, at 1425. 
110
  Up to forty percent of a plot may be taken without compensation.  The land maybe taken without 
compensation for the purpose of sports facilities and buildings intended for educational, cultural, religious 
or health services, among other public uses.  E.g. HOLZMAN-GAZIT, supra note 11, at 19-21. 
111
  Id. at 31-32. 
112
  Cohen, supra note 2, at 536. 
113
  Kelly, supra note 7, at 940; EAGLE, supra note 1, at 189-90; Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 1, at 
137-39. 
114
  Garnett, supra note 2, at 106; Cohen, supra note 2, at 538. 
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with easy accessible homes).115  Sentimental attachment to property may 
result in the subjective value of the property being higher than the fair 
market value.116  There is also the uncompensated “dignitary harms” where 
the property owners feel unsettled and vulnerable in the eminent process.117  
Given the undercompensation problem that exists even with fair 
market value compensation, the undercompensation problem can only be 
much more severe under the Singapore regime, which expressly provides 
compensation lower than market value.  Indeed, a commenter in a 
comparative study of takings law in China, the U.S., and Singapore, opines 
that there would be prevalent abuse of eminent domain powers in Singapore 
given this severe undercompensation. 118 
B. No Wide Spread Rent-seeking or Inefficiency in Singapore 
Given the government’s wide eminent domain powers coupled with 
severe undercompensation, one would expect Singapore to be riddled with 
widespread rent-seeking and inefficiency.  The broad scope appears to 
provide fertile grounds for interest groups to maneuver the government into 
takings for their own benefits while the lower than market value 
compensation exacerbates the government’s failure to internalize social 
costs.  Yet various studies and surveys suggest that Singapore has not 
suffered from the predicted perils of rent-seeking and inefficiencies.   
1. Rent-seeking: Surveys on Corruption 
Corruption has three main forms:  rent-seeking, leaks and levies.119  
Echoing the rent-seeking problem of wide eminent domain powers as 
identified by conventional takings discourse, preliminary empirical evidence 
suggests that the quality of national property rights arrangements may be an 
important institutional determinant of national corruption levels.120  Efficient 
property rights arrangements constrain the scope of corruption by, among 
other factors, drawing a well-defined line of state and bureaucrats’ 
                                           
115
  Kelly, supra note 7, at 952; Heller & Hills, supra note 3, at 1475 (these also include the discussing 
the subjective value of “social capital” arising from connection to local community, and business and, or 
eccentric property renovation to suit individual’s taste). 
116
  Garnett, supra note 2, at 107; Eagle, supra note 8, at 926. 
117
  Garnett, supra note 2, at 109. 
118
  Chenglin Liu, supra note 12, at 346. 
119
  Dick, supra note 17, at 46.  Leaks refer to the (mis) appropriation of public funds for personal 
gains, while levies involve petty corruption practice such as the unauthorized imposition of charges/taxes 
by officers.  Id. at 47. 
120
  Opper, supra note 18, at 198, 203. 
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authority.121  Indeed, avoidance of corruption is regarded as a limiting 
principle of the takings clauses.122  Some commentators concluded that “the 
absence of secure property rights is the cause of corruption, and the creation 
of strong private property rights would be the cure for corruption.”123  
Singapore’s regime of wide eminent domain powers, undercompensation, no 
regulatory takings, and direct granting of eminent domain powers to private 
parties, seems ripe for corrupt government officials to exploit benefits for 
themselves and for favored individuals or groups.  
However, Singapore is one of the world’s least corrupt nations.  In a 
worldwide survey of 163 countries by the international non-profit 
organization Transparency International, Singapore came in fifth with a 
score of 9.4 (scores range from ten being highly clean and zero being highly 
corrupt) while the U.S. came in twentieth with a score of 7.3.124  In the 
World Bank-sponsored Worldwide Governance Indicators Project, which 
looks at 212 countries for a period of ten years, Singapore’s score for the 
“Control of Corruption” indicator was 2.20 in 2007 (three being the highest 
and minus three being the lowest) and was outranked by only eight other 
countries.  The U.S. had a score of 1.44 and was outranked by seventeen 
other countries.125  
2. Inefficiency: Surveys on National Governance 
Singapore also did well in the “Government Effectiveness” and 
“Regulatory Quality” indicators.  Singapore’s score of 2.41 for “Government 
Effectiveness” was the top score in the study, with the U.S. scoring 1.62 at 
seventeenth place.126  For the “Regulatory Quality” indicator, Singapore 
scored 1.87 and was just behind Hong Kong’s and Luxembourg’s top score 
of 1.89.  The U.S.’s score of 1.45 ranked it fifteenth.127  In addition, 
Singapore has consistently done well in various global rankings on 
                                           
121
  Id. at 201. 
122
  Eagle, supra note 8, at 927. 
123
  O’Driscoll & Hoskins, supra note 104, at 12. 
124
 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 20, at 325-30.  When Transparency International first 
started the corruption perceptions index in 1998, Singapore was ranked seventh out of eighty-five countries 
with a score of 9.1.  The United States was ranked seventeenth, with a score of 7.5.  TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (Susan Côté-Freeman & Jeremy Pope eds., 1999). 
125
 In 1996, Singapore’s score was 2.24, while the U.S.’ score was 1.75.  Daniel Kaufmann et al., 
Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2007 94-96 (World Bank, 
Working Paper No. 4654, 2008).   
126
 Id. at 85-87.  In 1996, Singapore’s score was 2.31 while U.S.’ score was 2.15. 
127
 Id. at 88-90.  In 1996, Singapore’s score was 1.66 while the U.S.’ score was 1.26. 
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economic development and competitiveness.128  Singapore is not only one of 
the world most competitive economies according to the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook by Swiss business school International Institute 
for Management Development (“IMD”), but it also ranks among the top 
countries in terms of the government efficiency criterion.129  Other local 
studies130 and overseas studies,131 have also echoed the efficiency and 
effective governance of the Singaporean governance institution. 
3. Limitations of these Studies 
It is important to note the inadequacies and inconclusiveness of these 
various studies and surveys.  Studies of corruption have been criticized on 
several grounds, including:  “corruption cannot be measured”; “subjective 
data reflect vague and generic perceptions of corruption rather than specific 
objectives realities”; and “subjective data are too unreliable for use in 
measuring corruption.”132  Even defenders of these surveys acknowledge 
elements of subjectivity and uncertainty in these surveys.133 
In particular, the above-mentioned corruption rating by Transparency 
International and the other surveys is based on the perception of corruption 
across the board and may not necessarily correlate with the abuses in 
eminent domain and other government takings.134  Further, many other 
factors may affect the level of corruption and government abuses in a 
country, such as political structure, judiciary independence, access to 
information, enforcement of criminal law against corruption, and poverty.135  
In the same vein, surveys and studies in relation to government efficiency 
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 Michelle Tay, S’pore Continues to do Well in Global Rankings, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), June 16, 
2008 (discussing the various surveys). 
129
 Anna Teo, S’pore’s the Second Most Competitive Economy, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), May 15, 
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top ranking in government efficiency, see Anna Teo, S’pore’s Regains 2nd Spot in IMD Competitive 
Rankings, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), May 5, 2004; Narendra Aggarwal, S’pore No. 2 Again for 
Competitiveness, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Apr. 25, 2001, at 4 (top for five years prior to 2001). 
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 Chuang Peck Ming, S’pore Pips US to be 1st in Competitiveness, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), May 30, 
1996, at 1 (Study by Geneva-based World Economic Forum ranked Singapore first for “government.”  The 
“government” factor refers to openness of government, efficiency of bureaucracy and burden of tax 
system).  See also Chuang Peck Ming, Bouquets for Singapore, with a few Brickbats, BUSINESS TIMES 
(Sing.), Sep. 7, 1994, at 17. 
132
 See Daniel Kaufmann et al., Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION 
REPORT 2007 318-21 (Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007). 
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 Id. at 319-20. 
134
 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 20. 
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  See Cobus de Swardt, Lessons Learned from Anti-corruption Campaigns around the World, in 
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2006 119 (Jana Kotalik & Diana Rodriguez eds., 2006). 
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suffer from these same problems of indeterminate correlation and the 
presence of other contributing factors.   
4. Conclusion 
Notwithstanding these limitations, various studies on corruption and 
national governance have failed to live up to the predictions of conventional 
takings discourse.  In relation to the surveys of corruption, it is worth noting 
that in other developing countries such as China, corruption related to land is 
deemed the most problematic.136  Singapore’s government has in fact 
aggressively acquired land with the aid of the Land Acquisition Act.137  The 
lack of a regulatory takings doctrine also opens up vast opportunities for 
rent-seeking and corruption in areas other than land acquisition.  Similarly, 
one cannot easily dismiss the significant negative impact on regulatory 
quality or government efficiency arising from regulations that impose 
excessive social costs under no constraints of a regulatory takings doctrine.  
At the very least, the consistency and strength of Singapore’s 
performance strongly suggest that the conventional discourse on the perils of 
wide eminent domain power and weak property rights is not telling the 
whole story.  As discussed in the next part, there are serious theoretical 
deficiencies with the conventional discourse. 
IV. Explaining the Singapore Paradox (I): Givings In Theory 
Conventional takings discourse emphasizes the need for restricting 
government taking powers and ensuring adequate compensation to combat 
the twin vices of rent-seeking and inefficiency.  However, even the most 
restrictive eminent domain powers and comprehensive compensation 
scheme would not eliminate rent-seeking and inefficiencies since the root of 
problems lies in government allocation of benefits.  
 
                                           
136
  Jianlin Chen, supra note 23, at 118-19 (discussing the severe corruption in China’s land 
acquisition process and government’s recognition of the problem). 
137
  Ricquier, supra note 38, at 266 (percentage of state land increase from forty-nine percent in 1969 
to approximately sixty-five percent in 1975 alone).  However, the amount of the land acquired by the 
government has dropped significantly in recent times, where the land acquired from 1985 to 1994, only 
one-tenth of that acquired from 1966 to 1984.  See Williams, supra note 56.  Nonetheless, the government 
is still not shy of acquiring land for broad policy purposes, such as recouping public investment and 
preventing windfall gain, even in comparatively recent times; infra Part V.C.1.c.  
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A. The Deficiencies of Conventional Takings Discourse 
1. Rent-seeking: Still have Rent Available for Seeking 
Given the widespread concerns about the danger of rent-seeking by 
interest groups—especially under the availability of wide eminent domain 
power—it is surprising that little takings literature is directed at this 
problem, which is arguably the root of eminent domain abuses.  Reform 
proposals for eminent domain abuses have included payment of cash 
premiums to deter governments from overusing condemnation against 
owners who suffer incompensable losses,138 restrictions on eminent domain 
against subsequent transfer/acquisition by private parties,139 greater judicial 
control on “public use,”140 and even banning of eminent domain for 
economic development all together.141 
However, increasing the cost and/or difficulty of the exercise of 
eminent domain merely decreases the attractiveness of eminent domain as a 
tool for rent-seeking.  Neither option eliminates the incentive for abuse when 
the benefit sufficiently outweighs the increased cost or does anything to 
deter rent-seeking behavior.142  The emphasis on restricting eminent domain 
will simply divert government abuses and rent-seeking to other 
mechanisms.143  While the public outcries after Kelo have restricted the use 
of eminent domain for private benefit through legislative amendments in 
Iowa, tax increment financing for infrastructure projects that benefit private 
developers remains permissible.144  This not only leaves open room for rent-
seeking but it also diverts taxpayers’ money from other government 
recipients, especially school districts that rely significantly on property tax 
revenues.145   
Moreover, the risk of abuses and other political vices such as 
corruption and favoritism from unfettered takings applies equally, if not 
                                           
138
  Kelly, supra note 7, at 941; Heller & Hills, supra note 3, at 1483-84. 
139
  Cohen, supra note 2, at 560; Sanderfur, supra note 1, at 757 (enacting 2006 eminent domain 
restriction in South Dakota), 766 (2006 proposal by Louisiana for eminent domain restrictions). 
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  Heller & Hills, supra note 3, at 1485. 
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  Cohen, supra note 2, at 499. 
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  Jianlin Chen, supra note 23, at 127. 
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  See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 102, at 1449. 
144
  George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic Development: Forgoing 
Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 92-93 
(2008).  Tax increment financing occurs when a local government ear-marks future increases in property 
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87-96. 
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  Id. at 83. 
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more, to unfettered givings.146  This is because “givings may produce 
winners without identifiable losers, making it an attractive policy tool.”147  A 
clever government can easily distribute benefits to favored constituents to 
the exclusion of citizens who are not part of the government coalition or 
influential interest groups while raising revenue from all citizens.148  The 
benefits are allocated to a small concentrated group while the costs, many of 
which are hidden, are spread out at minimal levels to numerous people.149  It 
is rational to be ignorant of all the costs resulting from government actions 
given the high information costs, especially relative to the limited incentive 
arising out of this information (i.e. the minimal probability of affecting the 
government’s policy and the limited aversion of cost in the even of 
success).150  On the other hand, beneficiaries of a government policy are 
typically a small discrete group that receives a concentrated benefit and has 
disproportionately strong incentives to acquire information on these policies 
and attempt to influence them.151   
The vast expansion of the federal government’s regulatory power 
since the turn of the twentieth century has opened up unprecedented 
opportunities for rent-seeking by business, labor and other interests.152  The 
government’s regulatory power provides an unusually fertile source of 
rent.153  Politicians use corruption or the legitimate alternative of campaign 
contribution to capitalize on these rent-seeking efforts.154  “The legislative 
process rewards legislators who use political means to favor highly 
motivated interest groups at the expense of fragmented, diverse and possibly 
unknown interests.”155  “Politicians are faced with strong market force 
incentives to enact laws that serve private rather than public interests.”156  
“Much legislation frankly seeks to achieve a wider distribution of wealth by 
                                           
146
  Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 23, at 574. 
147
  Id. at 574-75. 
148
  Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 289 (1990). 
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  ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, PLANNING FOR SERFDOM: LEGAL ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND DOWNTOWN 
DEVELOPMENT 41 (1991). 
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  Dwight R. Lee, Government Regulation and Property Rights, in THE EGLAR COMPANION TO THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 310, 315 (Enrico Colmbatto ed., Edward Elgar 2004). 
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  Id.; see Kelly, supra note 7, at 34-37 (“the concentrated benefit problem”). 
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  Bradley A. Smith, Hamilton at Wits End: The Lost Discipline of the Spending Clause vs. the False 
Discipline of Campaign Finance Reform, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 117, 128 (2001). 
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  EAGLE, supra note 1, at 25; ANDERSON & HUGGINS, supra note 28, at 76 (“To make matters 
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  ANDERSON & HUGGINS, supra note 28, at 53. 
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  MALLOY, supra note 149, at 40. 
156
  Steven J. Eagle, Privatizing Urban Land Use Regulation: The Problem of Consent, 7 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 905, 910 (1999) (quoting Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through 
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 (1986)). 
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divesting owners of their right to use property to its maximum advantage 
and by altering contractual arrangements.”157  
“Higher government spending increases opportunities for private rent-
seeking from the government,” resulting in “a cause and effect relationship 
by which the growth rate of government spending accounts for more than 
eighty percent or more of the growth rate in campaign spending.”158  These 
large campaign contributions arguably lead to quid pro quo corruption 
whereby legislative votes are exchanged for campaign contributions.159  
There is growing evidence that such campaign contributions do have an 
effect on political decision-making.160  Economically and normatively, there 
is no difference between a legal campaign contribution to politicians to 
procure a favorable government regulation and an illegal bribe to politicians 
to procure the same favorable government regulation.  The politicians in 
both cases are corrupt because, rather than acting in a supposedly neutral 
manner for the interest of the public, the politicians modify their behaviors 
and allocate benefits to the rent-seekers due to the benefits the rent-seekers 
provided to the politicians.161   
These risks are borne out in practice.  A study of Indianapolis’s 
government property development activities reveals that the activities were 
highly advantageous to certain developers.162  In addition, “although public 
funds were used to subsidize and promote a wide range of projects in 
Indianapolis, many of the benefactors of these undertakings turn out to have 
been on the planning, management, or oversight boards of the City 
Committee and the public entities acting with the authority over the 
projects.”163  In Malaysia, after the government was forced to reveal the 
beneficiaries of major government economic programs, the list of 
beneficiaries released was populated with royalties, senior civil servants, 
politically connected individuals and family members of leaders.164  The 
need for transparency only arose during periods of economic turmoil, which 
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  ELY, supra note 3, at 174. 
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resulted in insufficient goodies to go around.165  The recent “pay-to-play” 
corruption scandal involving former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich166 
only serves to highlight the fact that corruption and rent-seeking arises 
primarily out of the ability to give, not take.  
2. Inefficiency: Still no Full Internalization 
As discussed above,167 conventional takings discourse focuses on 
adequately compensating government takings victims to ensure cost-
internalization on government decision-making.168  However, as 
governments respond to political rather than market incentives, focusing on 
making government pay does not necessarily mean social costs will be 
incorporated into its calculus.169  When confronted with the additional outlay 
of compensation, governments may simply shift the additional costs to either 
the broad tax base or to deficit spending in order to incur correspondingly 
low political costs.170  Indeed, Daryl Levinson, through public choice 
models, dispels the common myth on the justification of just compensation 
and concludes that cost remedies (requiring government to pay) do not 
necessarily result in either internalization of cost or effective deterrence.171 
Moreover, while takings literature assumes that government does not 
internalize social costs and thus has to be forced to pay money from the 
treasury, it ignores the social benefits of the equation or any requirement for 
the government to internalize the social benefits.  The literature assumes 
rather optimistically that governments apply a more altruistic function in the 
giving aspect as opposed to the taking aspect.172  This is ironic given that 
public choice theory has challenged the notion that administrative agencies’ 
personnel can actively and single-mindedly pursue the public interest 
without being affected by their own self-interest.173   The same logic of 
inefficiency for takings should apply when property or property rights are 




 Auctioning Illinois, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 2008, §2, at 3. 
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 See supra Part III.A.2. 
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 See also Levinson, supra note 25, at 348-49. 
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efficient economy, are so spread out over the entire population that it is rational for an individual to be 
ignorant or indifferent about them given the cost of information and the limited impact of an individual.  
See also Lee, supra note 150, at 315. 
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 Id. at 350. 
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transferred to private hands.174   Inefficiency is not averted even if all the 
social costs are fully internalized through compensation of takings victims175 
since the social benefits are often not internalized.176  Just like 
undercompensation will cause inefficiency where the full costs of the 
takings are not internalized,177 unaccounted givings will result in positive 
externalities that would create fiscal illusion if not internalized.178   
Inefficiency still results when socially efficient projects are not undertaken 
because it is too costly for the government.  Opportunity cost also 
exacerbates inefficiency when the allocation of a government benefit is 
based on political influence rather than actual efficiency.179 
B. Conclusion: Need for Emphasis on the Givings Aspect 
In conclusion, focusing only on the takings aspect of the equation will 
neither ensure efficiency nor constrain rent-seeking.  Rent-seeking is not (or 
maybe “cannot be” would be better) tackled at its source because the 
allocation of government benefits provides many opportunities/incentives 
for rent-seeking.  Rent-seeking is not tackled at its source as the allocation of 
government benefits still provides ample opportunities for rent-seeking.  
Inefficiency remains very much alive since social benefits of government 
actions are still not internalized.  A complete picture requires equal focusing 
on the givings aspect.  Givings jurisprudence is the flipside of takings 
jurisprudence.  While takings jurisprudence focuses on identifying those 
diminutions of property caused by the government actions that must be 
compensated, givings jurisprudence seeks to determine under what 
circumstances beneficiaries of government actions must be charged for 
received benefits.180  This is not only essential in combating rent-seeking and 
inefficiency but also provides other important benefits.  
By imposing appropriate charges on government benefits, rent-
seeking activities are significantly curtailed since the government recoups 
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the “rent” through the charges.  For example, private developers will have 
little incentive to lobby the local government to exercise eminent domain for 
subsequent transfer to themselves if they are made to pay competitive 
market value for the acquired land.  This will be far more effective in 
preventing the rent-seeking abuses by private developers than any 
restrictions on eminent domain.181 Unlike in the U.S. where the private 
developers obtained land on the cheap, English public authorities “are 
prevented from using cheap land assembly as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations with private businesses over decisions to locate (or relocate).” 
182
  This possibly explains why eminent domain for the benefit of private 
developers does not generate such public outrage and controversies in the 
United Kingdom (“U.K.”).  While not part of typical takings discourse, this 
requirement that the local government must obtain the highest price for the 
land would in itself prevent dubious and controversial eminent domain cases 
such as Poletown Neighborhood v. City of Detroit183 and 99 Cents Stores v. 
Lancaster Redevelopment Agency184 without any reference to the public use 
requirement.185  Indeed, “[s]adly for special interest groups, user fees tend to 
maintain competition and generate no rents for [these groups].”186  Similarly, 
the ability to recoup benefits arising out of government actions will enhance 
the government’s financial capabilities in undertaking such benefits-
generating activities.  
In addition, government givings or takings are likely to be 
accompanied by some other corresponding takings or givings.187  Having 
used eminent domain to take private property from private owners in the 
name of economic development, it is common for the government to transfer 
that plot of land to private developers.188  Zoning can also be seen as a 
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competition between property owners whose property value is negatively 
affected with property owners whose property value is positively affected.189  
The inextricable relationship between takings and givings dictates the 
importance of the giving jurisprudence in developing a coherent takings 
jurisprudence.190 
Furthermore, both givings and takings affect relative wealth.191  
Current takings jurisprudence is only concerned with diminutions of 
absolute wealth.192  However, changes in relative wealth should not be any 
less important than changes in absolute wealth.  Both givings and takings 
affect the poverty gap, which should be an important social-economical 
consideration in any government action.193  When a government expends 
substantial investment and efforts to engage in massive urban renewal and 
revitalization in a particular area, benefits to that particular area “come at the 
expense of equivalent or perhaps greater [benefit] that could have occurred 
elsewhere but for the intervention of political means.”194 Making a particular 
area a “comparatively richer and nicer place to live in” means other areas are 
made comparatively worse off.195  
Finally, givings, like takings, raise great concerns of fairness.  “It is 
inequitable to bestow a benefit upon some people that, in all fairness and 
justice, should be given to the public as a whole.”196  It is clearly unfair for 
the government to discriminatorily allocate benefits on the basis of the 
recipient”s ability to exploit the political system.197  
These merits are further elaborated in the next two parts where the 
various manners in which Singapore imposes charges on government 
beneficiaries will be examined and contrasted with U.S. practices which 
very often leave these benefits “uncharged.”   
                                                                                                                              
wanting to build a CVS “mega drugstore” and obtaining a 20-year lease of $100 annually after the borough 
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V. Explaining the Singapore Paradox (II): Givings In Practice 
While Singapore arguably fares very badly in the takings aspect given 
its wide powers of eminent domain and low compensation, this is mitigated 
by Singapore’s emphasis on the givings aspects of the equation.  This Part 
examines how Singapore charges for all three different types of givings:  
physical, regulatory, and derivative.  Comparisons with the U.S. and other 
countries highlight Singapore’s givings rationale.  
A. Physical Givings 
It is common sense that when government directly transfers property 
to a private individual, it should be transferred at a fair market value in the 
absence of compensatory or redistributive purpose.  Yet occasions where 
private developers acquire land through eminent domain practically for free 
are unfortunately common.198  The ability to decide the award of large 
lucrative government contracts also provides a rich avenue for rent-seeking 
and corruption, as illustrated by the recent Blagojevich scandal.199  This 
scandal has prompted Illinois to ban firms from making political donations 
to elected official if the elected official is responsible for contracts that are 
awarded to the donating firms.200  While this helps constrain corruption, 
another approach to the problem is simply to ensure that the government 
obtains the best value.  
This section examines Singapore’s emphasis on competitive bidding 
for the award of government contracts and the disposal of government’s 
assets together with the en-bloc process.  The en-bloc process is particularly 
interesting where there are no allegations of corruption or rent-seeking 
despite eminent domain powers being directly wielded by private 
developers.   
1. Award of Contracts and Disposal of Assets 
Proper procedures in public contracting are important for efficiency 
and maximizing returns to the public sector.201  Several safeguards are built 
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into Singapore’s government procurement process to avoid corruption and 
ensure efficiency.  First, technical specifications for the procurement/tender 
should not be restricted as to any particular supplier, trademark, design or 
patent.202  More importantly, the government is not to seek or accept advice 
on these technical specifications from persons who are likely to have a 
commercial interest in the procurement in question.203  Second, if selective 
procedures are used for the procurement, a sufficient number of applicable 
suppliers must be invited to ensure competition.204  Third, the contract must 
be awarded to the lowest price or most advantageous tender that complied 
with the terms and conditions of tender and contract requirements.205  
Fourth, the contracting authority is to provide, upon request by the rejected 
tenderer, “pertinent information on the reasons why his tender was not 
selected, the characteristics and relative advantages of the tender selected, 
and the name of the successful tenderer.”206  Failure to comply with these 
safeguards will render the government contracting authority liable to 
compensate parties participating in the tender or procurement for the loss 
arising from the non-compliance.207 
Other safeguards exist.  All government tenders must be posted online 
or in other widely accessed public media.208  Use of limited tender must be 
approved at a high level.209  The Government Instruction Manuals require 
that “the allocation of public assets should be done in objective and fair 
manner” and maximizing of total returns.210  These government contracts are 
subjected to audit by the Auditor-General.211  The Auditor-General examines 
the books of government ministries and statutory boards every year, with 
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heavier emphasis on those with large procurement budgets.212  Procurement 
irregularities and other non-compliance with government procurement 
procedures are a common focus in these audits.213  Reflecting an inherent 
concern about the risk of inefficiency and corruption in the discretion of 
allocating resources, sale of government assets through direct private sale 
are frowned upon even if measures are taken to redress the deficiencies.214  A 
report commissioned by Transparency International concluded that 
“Singapore government procurement is based on value for money through 
fair and open competition with no favoritism towards any supplier, whether 
big or small, local or foreign.”215  
This is a far cry from neighboring countries where government 
procurement is a rich source of excesses and possible corruptions.216  Public 
contracting in the U.S. has also raised concerns.217  The market for 
government contracts in the U.S. is easily worth trillions of dollars even 
before the recent massive government bailout, and it is unsurprisingly 
plagued by “lobbying and political corruption scandals” and “controversial 
payments to, and actions by, government contractors.”218  In addition, 
“newspapers and magazines have been filled with articles about awarding of 
noncompetitive contracts to politically connected companies.”219  
Nonetheless, this is not primarily caused by the absence of formal laws since 
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 Judith Tan, Guardians of the Public Coffers, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug 15, 2008. 
213
 E.g., Anna Teo, Committee Calls for Review of Sentosa Land Sales, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), May 
26, 2007; Vince Chong, Auditor-General Raps BCCS Again, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), July 10, 2003; Salma 
Khalik, Lapses Seen in Govt Agencies, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), June 15, 2000, at 27; Salma Khalik, 
Auditor-General Report Cites Many Irregularities, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Sep. 8, 1999, at 3; Dominic 
Nathan, Airport Running Without Land Deed, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), July 17, 1998, at 51. 
214
 Anna Teo, supra note 213; Vince Chong, supra note 213 (Despite the government appointing five 
property agents to sell the property, the Auditor-General opined that “[w]ithout an open tender or auction, 
the sale lacked transparency and there was no assurance that all interested buyers had been reached.”). 
215
 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 201, at 28. 
216
 In Malaysia: Pauline Ng, KL Plans Index on Ministries’ Accountability, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), 
Sep. 15, 2007 (inflating cost of procurement supplies by up to 100 times); Pauline Ng, A Budget for 
Spending More? Fine – if the Money’s Well Spent, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), Sep. 10, 2007 (examples 
include a 10-title set of technical books costing RM 417 being contracted at a cost of RM 10,700).  In 
Thailand: Nirmal Ghosh, Thailand’s Super Fighter: Jaruvan Maintaka has Defied Attempts by the 
Powerful to Derail her Campaign against Corruption, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Feb. 11, 2006 (for example, 
a road project was contracted with no bargaining with bidders and cost the state 1.6 billion baht more that it 
should have). 
217
 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 275-76 (Amber Poroznuk ed., 
2006); Jennifer Jo Snider Smith, Competition and Transparency: What works for Public Procurement 
Reform, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 85, 88 (2008). 
218
 Paula L. Hopper & Robert G. Hensley, Jr., What Do You Mean I’m a Lobbyist?: New Government 
Contractor Restrictions and What They Will Mean for Banking Institutions, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 103, 
103 (2008). 
219
  Lani A. Perlman, Guarding the Government’s Coffers: The Need for Competition Requirements to 
Safeguard Federal Procurement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3187, 3189 (2007) (citation omitted).   
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the competitive and procedural measures adopted by Singapore are similar 
to the U.S. equivalent.220  More importantly, the inevitable presence of 
exemptions in both jurisdictions221 means the focus in this area is more on 
actual interpretation and implementation of the law rather than the 
underlying jurisprudence or legal framework per se.  
Thus while the competitive and transparent nature of the Singaporean 
government’s awarding of contract and disposal of government assets does 
contribute to efficiency and the lack of corruption, her laws and policies in 
this aspect are not entirely unusual or special on their own.  As discussed in 
the remainder of this part, it is how this maximum value for government 
rationale is applicable to other areas where the allocation of benefits is less 
direct and obvious that the givings jurisprudence can be best appreciated.   
2. En-bloc: Economic Development Eminent Domain Without Abuse 
As discussed above,222 the en-bloc process allows private developers 
to compulsorily acquire property from homeowners who objected to the sale 
if a certain percentage of the majority has agreed to the sale.  The legislative 
amendment that granted this eminent domain power223 to private developers 
was unapologetic to the underlying objectives of redevelopment of land and 
urban renewal,224 which were duly acknowledged as differing from 
traditional public use.225  Yet there is no public outcry of the government 
being “merely the conduit” 226 hijacked by private developers for private 
benefit.  This is not surprising given that the private developers in the en-
bloc process do not enjoy the obscene benefits commonly seen in U.S. 
economic development eminent domain cases.227  Private developers 
typically have to fork out a high premium of between 60% to 100% above 
market value for the property from their own pocket.228  Thus, while there 
                                           
220
  See id. at 3198-05.  
221
  U.S: Id. at 3199-02.  Singapore: see discussion supra Part V.A.1. 
222
  See discussion, supra Part II.D. 
223
  Jianlin Chen, supra note 23, at 141-42 (explaining that notwithstanding the appearance of a 
private collective sale, eminent domain powers is exercised during an en-bloc sale). 
224
  Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 1998, supra note 82, at Col 614 (testimony of Mr. Chuang 
Shaw Peng). 
225
  Id. at Col 608 (testimony of Assoc. Prof. Chin Tet Yung); Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill 
(As reported from Select Committee), 1999, supra note 87, at Col 1336 (Mr. Simon Tay). 
226
  See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 482 (Mich. 1981) 
(Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).  
227
  See discussion is notes, supra note 188. 
228
 Kalpana Rashiwala, Sing Holdings Inks Deal to Buy Hillcourt Apts for $361m, BUSINESS TIMES 
(Sing.), Mar. 23, 2007 (60% premium); Uma Shankari, Heiwa Court Sold for $11 Million; Elmira Heights 
also up for Collective Sale for $326m, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), Feb. 22, 2007 (70% premium); Joyce Teo, 
Anderson 18 Owners to Get $6.75m Each from Condo Sale, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Mar. 6, 2007 (98.5% 
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are many criticisms of Singapore’s en-bloc process,229 none concern 
corruption or rent-seeking behavior by the private developers.  
One might argue that the en-bloc law is a piece of legislation that is 
clearly beneficial to private developers and is likely to have been lobbied 
heavily by them.  However, given the extreme wide scope eminent domain 
power coupled with the significant fiscal cost of eminent domain, it would 
be strange for private developers in Singapore to lobby for such a piece of 
legislation.  They could have easily done what the private developers are 
doing in the United States, namely get the government to exercise eminent 
domain and then transfer the land cheaply to them.  Even if private 
developers have indeed lobbied (or bribed) for this legislation,230 the fact 
that they have to resort to this legislation, which requires them to obtain a 
super majority of owners’ approval and paying above market compensation 
out of their own pocket, shows that they are unable to get much mileage out 
of economic development from eminent domain.  Singapore’s stringent 
procedures in asset disposal only strengthened the importance of proper 
charging for physical givings by the government. 
B. Regulatory Givings 
The constraining of physical givings is certainly important.  With the 
local government constrained in providing financial incentives to attract 
private business,231 private developers in the U.K. do not rely on eminent 
domain as a primary source of profit, helping negate the public impression 
                                                                                                                              
premium); Tan Dawn Wei, They Don’t Even Own the Land They’re Fighting Over, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), 
May 20, 2007 (offer $1.37 million when market price is $770,000); Carolyn Quek, 140-Unit Estate Sold 
But One Won’t Move; Buyer City Developments Planning Legal Action Against 63-year-old Who is 
Uncontactable Now, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), June 4, 2007 (60% to 90% premium). 
229
 See, e.g., concerns about the lack of clarity, transparency, and safeguards in the current en-bloc 
process vis-à-vis possible abuse by certain owners: Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 2007, 
Parliament No. 11 Hansard (Sing.) 20 Sept. 2007 (testimony of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Law, Prof. S Jayakumar); pro-sale owners using common fund to further the en-bloc process for their own 
private gain: Tan Dawn Wei, En Bloc Investors or Just Vultures?; Traders Who Sniff Out Old Units and 
Push Hard For Collective Sale Stir Up Mixed Emotions Among Residents  STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), May 27, 
2007; historical values are lost as they are not factored into the negotiation between owners and private 
developers: Arthur Sim, Place Older Buildings’ Heritage Along with Commercial Value; Professional 
Body Urges Reviews to Aid Conservation, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), May 5, 2007; social externalities like 
environment pollution arising out of the demolition and construction in the redevelopment process:  Storeys 
[sic] of Dust and Noise; Homes and Businesses Surrounded by En Bloc Constructions Bemoan the Physical 
Discomfort and Additional Costs They Bring, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Sep. 2, 2007; increased anxiety 
caused to other property owners who want to see their residence as a home and not a mere commodity:  
Linda Lim, Can Money Ease Loss of Memories?, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), June 21, 2007.  See generally 
Jianlin Chen, supra note 23, at 138-40. 
230
 There is no evidence of this happening. 
231
  Allen, supra note 182, at 92-93. 
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that the power of eminent domain has been abused for the sake of private 
interests.232  However, these U.K. constraints focus on the possible financial 
burden on the government and may still allow conferment of huge private 
benefits in the form of favorable planning or zoning decisions that impose 
no direct costs on the government.233  This is a serious loophole for abuse 
since it is through planning permission where the value of the land can be 
dramatically enhanced.234  From an economics perspective, there is no 
fundamental distinction between “property” and “regulation” because both 
can be equally valuable.235  Indeed, the government’s regulatory powers 
provide an unusually fertile source of rent.236  The opportunistic behavior of 
benefiting particular group through beneficial legislation “is less painful to 
lawmakers than levying taxes to finance [beneficial] governmental 
programs.”237  Here, Singapore’s charging of regulatory givings helps close 
this loophole. 
1. Development Charge 
a. How it is Charged 
Development charges are imposed when written permissions for 
development of land beyond existing use are granted.238  Development 
charges are payable when a developer applies to change the intensity or use 
of land to enhance its value.239  The Ministry of National Development sets 
the rate in consultation with the Chief Valuer, who takes into account current 
market values.240  As a general rule, higher premiums are levied for projects 
                                           
232
  Id. at 95-96. 
233
  Id. at 90-92. 
234
  Id. at 95 (£7000 per hectare mixed-use agricultural land versus £2.6 million per hectare of 
residential “bulk” land). 
235
  EAGLE, supra note 1, at 332. 
236
  Id. at 25; ANDERSON & HUGGINS, supra note 28, at 76. 
237
  ELY, supra note 3, at 174. 
238
  Planning (Amendment) Bill, 1964, Parliament No. 1 Hansard (Sing.) 2 Nov. 1964, Col 146 
(testimony Minister for National Development, Lim Kim San); Ricquier, supra note 38, at 277 (“The 
development charge is the difference between the Development Baseline and the Development Ceiling.”); 
These two terms are defined in sections 36 of the Planning Act (Cap. 232 (1998 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.)).  
Development Baseline basically means the value of the land based on the basic zoning permission, either 
under the original 1958 Master Plan or under a planning permission where development charges have been 
paid.  Development Ceiling means the sum of the value of development of the land previously authorized 
to be attained and the value of the land to be authorized by the planning permission. 
239
 Kalpana Rashiwala, Prime Residential DC Seen Rising 20-35%; But Potential En Bloc Sellers 
Remain Upbeat Due to Positive Outlook, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), Feb. 10, 2007. 
240
 Id. 
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in prime areas.241  It was initially designed to capture between 25% and 50% 
of the incremental value for the state when it was first implemented as a 
fixed rate in the 1960s.242  However, the law was later amended to impose 
development charges based on a prescribed percentage of the appreciation in 
land value, initially set at 70%.243  It is currently 70% for permission to 
develop land for any other purpose except business zone commercial use, 
which is 100%.244  
For ease of administration,245 a set of pre-determined and regularly 
revised tables stipulate the values for different geographical areas for prima 
facie calculation.246  They closely mirror property values and vary according 
to land use and locations.247  The current frequency of revision is every six 
months.248  The system is transparent since the revision of development 
charges reflects movement in property and land prices.249  The impact of the 
total development costs of the project is somewhat limited.  When the rate 
was increased from 50% to 70% in 2007, the increase in total development 
costs was only a few percentage points.250  
A property owner selling after securing planning permission to 
increase the plot ratio from 3.46 to 5.1 should be able to secure a higher 
value than $630 million if not for the fact that the new buyer would have to 
pay nearly $50 million of development charge before he can tap into the 
enhanced development potential from the planning permission.251  Similarly, 
when the zoning of a land was changed from “warehouse and office” to 
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 Abdul Hadhi, Development Charges go Up; Developers May Have to Absorb Hike, BUSINESS 
TIMES (Sing.), Sep. 1, 1995. 
242
 Koh & Lim, supra note 46, at 332. 
243
 Planning (Amendment) Bill, 1979, Parliament No. 4 Hansard (Sing.), 11 Dec. 1979, Col 525 
(1979) (testimony of Minister for National Development, Teh Cheang Wan). 
244
 Planning (Development Charges) Rules, Cap. 232, Section 40, §10 (2007 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.).  
245
 Planning (Amendment No. 2) Bill, 1989, Parliament No. 7 Hansard (Sing.) 4 Aug. 1989, Col 449 
(1989) (testimony of Minister of National Development, S. Dhanabalan). 
246
 Planning (Development Charges) Rules, supra note 244, §§ 3-5, First Schedule (Sing.).  The value 
from the table may be challenged through administrative avenue.  Planning Act, Cap. 232, § 39 (1998 Rev. 
Ed.) (Sing.) 
247
 Joyce Teo, Property Charge Hike May Cool En Bloc Fever, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), July 19, 2007. 
248
 Fiona Chan, Property Development Charges Barely Budge, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Mar. 1, 2008. 
249
 Ann Williams, Land Bids “May Drop” as Govt Jacks up Development Charges, STRAITS TIMES 
(Sing.), Sep. 1, 1995, at 48. 
250
 Maria Almenoar, Property Charge Hike Not Meant to Cool Collective Sale Fever, STRAITS TIMES 
(Sing.), July 23, 2007 (“For these sites, the DC hike could add 6 per cent or more to the land cost”); 
Joyce Teo, supra note 247 (“with the change, it expects the land cost for acquiring Hillcourt 
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  Kalpana Rashiwala, Royal Brothers in Talks to Buy Paragon By Sogo, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 
25, 1996, at 60. 
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prime residential development with increased plot ratio, the increase in land 
value would have to be tampered by the $1.75 million in development 
charges if the benefit of the zoning is to be realized.252  However, the 
development charge is unlikely to deter property developers because the 
developers will not be able to enjoy the appreciation in the property value if 
they do not pay for the development charges.253  As in other forms of taxes, 
whether the developers or buyers bear the charge depends on market 
forces.254 
 
b.  Legislative Rationale 
The legislative rationale for the development charges focused on the 
benefits landowners will enjoy from government zoning and planning 
decisions.255  From its initial enactment in 1964, the development charges 
were introduced “with a view to secure to the State the increases in value of 
land brought about by community development and not through the efforts 
of the landowner . . . .”256  Development charges were imposed such that 
“landowners or other interested persons who will benefit from the grant of 
permission must pay to the State a part of this benefit in the form of a 
development charge.”257  
Concerns about the windfall landowners would receive by mere re-
zoning continued to resonate in subsequent amendments of the relevant 
laws, with statements like “a windfall in land appreciation [will be 
conferred] on the land owners unless the Government is able eventually to 
tax part of the appreciation in the form of development charge,”258 or  
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  Michelin to Sell Prime Site Near S’pore River, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 18, 1995, at 39. 
253
  Ann Williams, Developers Expected to Absorb Bulk of Extra Costs, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Sep. 
3, 1994, at 48. 
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  Id.; LEUNG YEW KWONG, DEVELOPMENT LAND AND DEVELOPMENT CHARGE IN SINGAPORE 127 
(1987); J. BARRY CULLINGWORTH, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF PLANNING 79-80 (1993) (the more 
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construction market.  See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: 
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  Planning (Amendment) Bill, 1964, supra note 238, at Col 146 (Minister for National 
Development, Lim Kim San). 
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  Id. 
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  Planning (Amendment) Bill, 1982, Parliament No. 5 Hansard (Sing.), 3 Mar. 1982, Col 449 
(1982) (testimony of Minister for National Development, Teh Cheang Wan). 
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[T]he Development Charge is . . . levied where the value of 
land is enhanced as a result of some actions of the State, 
whether this is the building up of infrastructure that would 
allow land to be used more intensively, or whether this is some 
change in planning parameters, or some change of policy 
regarding land use.259   
In recent years, there has been an interesting shift in emphasis from this 
windfall rationale to focusing on the government’s expenses in value 
enhancement (building of infrastructure) and the need to recoup for further 
public infrastructure.260  Nonetheless, when the government increased the 
rate from 50% to 70% in 2007, the new rates were described as a “sharing of 
the gains and of the increase in value of the land as a result of Government’s 
planning approval.”261  
One lawmaker opined that from a social-economic perspective, it is 
perfectly legitimate to require landowners to give back a portion of 
realizable gains to the State by way of development charge when they 
benefit from the positive externalities arising from government’s planning 
actions.  There was also recognition that given the land scarcity situation in 
Singapore where real estate has great value, zoning and development 
charges laws have strong and far-reaching implications on social wealth 
distribution.262  
 
c. Difference and Merits   
While the United States has a similar scheme known as monetary 
exactions, the legislative rationale is very different.  In the United States, 
exactions and programs linking development rights with obligations to 
provide municipal improvements have become increasingly common.263  
Originally, development conditions were imposed for the provision of basic 
utilities on the site.264  This was later expanded to include “off-site” utilities 
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  Planning (Amendment) Bill, 2003, Parliament No. 10 Hansard (Sing.), 11 Nov. 2003, Col 3491 
(2003) (testimony of Minister for National Development, Mah Bow Tan). 
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  Id.; Almenoar, supra note 250. 
261
  Almenoar, supra note 250. 
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  Planning (Amendment) Bill, 1982, supra note 258, (testimony of Dr. Amy Khor Lean Susan). 
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  EAGLE, supra note 1, at 441 (“grown to a ‘full-blown land use fad’”); HOLZMAN-GAZIT, supra 
note 11, at 21; Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1731 
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  CULLINGWORTH, supra note 254, at 76; Rosenberg, supra note 254, at 199; HOLZMAN-GAZIT, 
supra note 11, at 21. 
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such as sewerage, parks and roads.265  A primary reason for this expansion 
was opposition from existing property owners against having to pay 
increased property taxes for the benefit of new property owners.266  Indeed, 
the trend towards greater development charges in the United States, Canada 
and the United Kingdom stemmed from the inability of local governments to 
shoulder the increased financial burdens of such developments.267  
The public discourse in the United States focuses on how to supply 
needed public improvements without increasing the general taxes, and it 
reflects the theme that growth “should pay its own way.”268  This is part of 
the general shift of civic culture to privatize development costs.269  It is 
indeed interesting to note that the U.S. courts struggle with categorizing the 
monetary exaction as either police power regulation or as a form of 
taxation,270 but fail to consider the possibility of treating it as a form of 
charging for the benefits arising from the development permit. 
Thus, while the United States imposes some charges upon granting 
development rights and planning permissions, there is a fundamental 
doctrinal difference from Singapore, which emphasizes the windfall arising 
from such development permissions.  The difference is crucial in light of the 
potential room for rent-seeking in this form of regulatory givings.  Zoning 
increases the opportunities for rent-seeking by allocating the right to develop 
through the political process.271  This is especially true because the 
development and business interests are well organized and have a long 
history of influencing state government, especially state legislatures.272  
Indeed, there have long been concerns that U.S. land use determinations are 
marked by questionable deal making and bias.273  Developers may get 
around zoning regulations by obtaining a variance with the help of a bribe or 
campaign contribution to the underpaid local government officials.274  For 
example, the ongoing Illinois corruption scandal includes allegations that a 
congressman obtained key zoning changes for projects whose developers 
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  CULLINGWORTH, supra note 254, at 77; Rosenberg, supra note 254, at 200; HOLZMAN-GAZIT, 
supra note 11, at 21; EAGLE, supra note 1, at 441 (providing a list of the common types of exactions). 
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  CULLINGWORTH, supra note 254, at 77; Rosenberg, supra note 254, at 180. 
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  Rosenberg, supra note 254, at 180. 
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Exactions: the “Substantial Excess” Test, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 3 (2005). 
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  Rosenberg, supra note 254, at 218. 
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  Sterk, supra note 263, at 1744; Eagle, supra note 8, at 918. 
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  Eagle, supra note 8, at 928-29; EAGLE, supra note 1, at 333. 
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  POPPER, supra note 28, at 10. 
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were major political donors.275  Ensuring a proper charge is imposed in these 
lucrative regulatory actions will certainly go a long way in reducing rent-
seeking and corruption in this area.  
Brad Charles considers it unfair when developers are forced to pay for 
development exactions when the development does not increase any 
additional burdens on the public infrastructure.276  However, “[i]f the sudden 
windfall gain brought about by the stroke of a pen is not partially creamed 
off in the form of a development charge, it may lead to accusations of unfair 
treatment and enrichment.”277  It is also interesting to note that the 
Recommendation D3 of the 1976 United Nations Conference on Human 
Settlements, held in Vancouver, recommended that: 
[T]the unearned increment resulting from the rise in land values 
resulting from change in use of land, from public investment or 
decision, or due to general growth of the community must be 
subject to appropriate recapture by public bodies (the 
community) unless the situation calls for other additional 
measures such as new patterns of ownership, the general 
acquisition of land by public bodies.278 
2. Other Regulatory Givings 
There are other examples where the Singapore government imposed a 
charge pursuant to a beneficial regulatory action due to concerns of a 
potential windfall to the recipients.  Two of these concerns are discussed 
below.279 
 
a. Allocation of Spectrum Use 
In selecting the mechanism for allocating the 3G telecommunication 
licenses, Singapore government decided to utilize the competitive auction 
model instead of a “beauty contest” mechanism where the regulatory 
authority made its decision based on the merits of the application of 
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  Todd Lighty et al., Gutierrez Cashes in with Donors, CHI.. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2008, (discussing 
allegations of improper zoning decision involving Congressman Luis Gutierrez and Ald. Manuel Flores). 
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  Charles, supra note 269, at 3. 
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  LEUNG YEW KWONG, supra note 254, at 126. 
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  Id. at 124. 
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  Bell & Parchomovsky consider the government givings like the granting of broadcasting rights for 
telecommunication companies as physical giving: Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 23, at 551.  However, 
the author thinks that since the value and allocation of these benefits arose out of the government’s 
regulatory power, it will be more appropriate to classify them as regulatory givings, at least for this paper.  
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telecommunication service providers.280  One of the important rationales 
driving the Singapore government’s decision was the prevention of 
“immediate windfall profit” under the “beauty contest” system.281  The 
Minister stated that “the [g]overnment has a responsibility to obtain fair 
value for a scarce resource.”282 
In contrast, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
allocated spectrum use through “comparative hearings” prior to 1981.283  
Political peddling was an unsurprising feature of these hearings given the 
high value of licenses allocated.284  This was replaced by a lottery where 
most of the licenses awarded by the lottery were resold.285  However, there 
was still room for political influence since the entry of the lottery was 
subject to certain qualification determinations by the authorities.286  Indeed, 
the legislative history of the federal licensing regime is characterized by 
legislators maximizing “political support by arbitrating a rent-seeking 
competition for valuable licenses . . . .”287  
It was not until 1993 when the U.S. Congress finally authorized the 
FCC to auction licenses of the spectrum through competitive bidding.288  In 
1997, this method of licensing was further made mandatory for future 
licensing proceedings save for some limited exemptions.289  The main 
rationale was to award the license to the highest valuer.290  “[R]ecovery for 
the public of a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made 
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available for commercial use” was also stated as an objective underlying the 
new auction mechanism.291  However, it is worth noting a subtle but 
important distinction from the Singapore rationale.  In the U.S., the 
“recovery for the public” rationale was driven more by budgetary pressure 
than an aversion to granting windfalls to private parties.292  Given the long 
history of political rent-seeking in the licensing regime, it is reasonable to 
doubt whether competitive bidding, an arguably more efficient and fairer 
allocation mechanism,293 would have been adopted without the budgetary 
pressure.   
    
b. Certificate of Entitlement (COE)  
Another form of regulatory bidding, the Certificate of Entitlement 
(“COE”) is a vehicle quota system implemented in Singapore since 1990 as 
a means to control traffic congestion.294  COE is a competitive tender system 
where potential car-owners bid for a limited number of car-ownership 
licenses.295  The givings rationale is again well encapsulated in the statement 
“[i]t is the Government’s responsibility to collect the market price for the 
COEs and to use the substantial revenue so collected for public projects 
which can benefit everyone.”296  Queuing and balloting were expressly 
rejected as a means of allocation due to the windfall profit for those who are 
quick to get in the queue or are merely lucky.297  The revenue collected 
helped maintain the budget and reduced the need to raise taxes.298  Indeed, 
the lowering of income tax rates was only made possible through the 
increases in indirect revenue levied on car ownership.299  A legislator also 
noted that while transport policies relating to car ownership “seemingly 
uninvolved” the majority of the population who were not car owners, the 
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  Id. at 693. 
292
  Crawford, supra note 283, at 967, 973-74 (explaining the pressure to reduce the ever-mounting 
budget deficit in the context of the 700 MHz auction, with the most noteworthy being the anonymous 
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293
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(testimony of Minister for Communications, Mah Bow Tan). 
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  Id. at Col 729 (Minister for Communications, Mah Bow Tan). 
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  Id. at Col 730 (Minister for Communications, Mah Bow Tan). 
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  Id. at Col 729 (Minister for Communications, Mah Bow Tan). 
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  Id. at Col 730 (Minister for Communications, Mah Bow Tan). 
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 Select Committee Report on Land Transportation Policy, 1990, Parliament No. 7 Hansard (Sing.), 
15 Jan. 1990, Col 934, 953 (1990) (testimony of Heng Chiang Meng).  
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policy could still be potentially detrimental to them.300  The failure to recoup 
the windfall to car owners arising from the government regulatory actions 
would have resulted in less government revenue available for public 
projects.301 
C. Derivative Givings 
Derivative givings are also extremely important.  A derivative giving 
occurs when property value is indirectly increased by a government 
action,302 be it a physical action such as the building of public amenities near 
the property or a regulatory action such as those mandating a “greenbelt” in 
surrounding land.303  The government actions are not directly targeted at the 
property or the property rights, but the value of the benefits received are not 
in any way less significant. Indeed, it is the subtlety of this sort of givings 
that makes it particularly vulnerable to rent-seeking behavior.  It is also in 
this aspect where we can best appreciate Singapore’s policy of imposing a 
fair charge for government givings. 
1. Discounting During Land Acquisition 
Part II.B above discussed the below market value compensation 
payable under the Singapore eminent domain regime.  However, beyond 
taking the lowest market value among certain stipulated dates, the 
compensation formula also effectively charges the owner of acquired 
property for benefits accruing from government’s actions.  
 
a.  The Provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 
First, section 33(5)(c) of the Land Acquisition Act excludes from 
compensation any increase in value of the acquired property over the past 
seven years by virtue of provision of public utilities and facilitates.304  
Second, section 33(1)(b) excludes increases in value of any other land 
owned by the same owner by virtue of the use that the acquired land will be 
put to.305  The first provision recoups the enhancement of value produced by 
government investment in public amenities.  These investments can 
constitute very substantial derivative givings especially in the early years 
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where the construction of public roads and other amenities produced a 
“phenomenal increase” in value for previously swampy and rural land.306  
The second provision emphasizes the inextricable relationship 
between takings and givings where the same act of eminent domain can 
produce significant benefits to the owner whose property is acquired.  
Indeed, in a land acquisition exercise for the construction of a mass transit 
station, the government acquired a small plot of land originally used as a car 
park in a private residential property.  A nominal S$1 was paid as 
compensation since the gains in value of the property from the eventual 
construction of the mass transit station (estimated by industry sources to be 
some $18 million) was much more than the value of the 220 square meters 
of land acquired.307  
 
b.  Legislative Rationale 
Consistent with the rationale behind the development charges,308 the 
Land Acquisition Act was designed to curb property speculation and 
windfalls.309  These provisions reflected the broad legislative guidelines 
“that no private land owner should benefit from development which has 
taken place at public expense.”310  The rationale was to “save the 
Government from having to give land-owners windfall gains and increases 
in value as a result of public expenditure incurred in the area.”311  It would 
be irrational if the government had to pay compensation at a value which 
Government itself had helped to enhance through public investment and 
provision of public infrastructure.312  Indeed, the policy that no private 
landowner should benefit from any of the governments’ efforts in providing 
for infrastructural changes and improvements was reflected in the 
amendments to the various relevant legislations.313  The Singapore courts 
have also echoed this unjustified windfall rationale in dealing with cases on 
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  Teng Fuh Holdings, 2006-3 Sing. L. Rep. at 536-37 (Jurong, Kallang Basin, and Kranji cited in 
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land acquisition.314  The courts have recognized that “the prevention of 
economic windfalls is one of the key policies underlying the Act.”315 
 
c. The North-East Mass-Transit Line 
This aversion to windfall gain by a private owner through 
government’s public investment is well illustrated by the relatively recent 
example of the North-East mass-transit line.  When building this new mass-
transit line in the mid-1990s, land acquired by the government included not 
only the actual railway line but also land around the proposed stations.316  
The purpose was to enable comprehensive redevelopment of the surrounding 
area and to “ensure that windfall capital gains resulting from construction of 
the North-East line accrue to the State rather than to individual property 
owners.”317  Preventing windfalls was especially important because the 
increase in land value was due to the government’s investment of S$5 billion 
of taxpayer money and thus should not go to individual landowners but 
should go to all the taxpayers.318  Indeed, the need to recoup the profit from 
the increased land value arising from the substantial investment of 
taxpayers’ money “is the reason why the Government needs to acquire the 
land for comprehensive redevelopment.”319  The discounting provisions 
allowed such recouping.  
 
d. Difference and Merits 
In the U.S, there is the “average reciprocity of advantage” doctrine, 
which has been used by U.S. courts to justify regulations that might have 
otherwise constituted takings but for the fact that the property owners 
obtained some benefits from the very same government actions.320  
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However, the doctrine’s scope is more limited and certainly does not operate 
to reduce the compensation payable in direct physical acquisition of land.321  
Interestingly, the U.S. has a benefit-offset principle similar to Singapore’s 
Land Acquisition Act, section 33(1)(b).322 Bell and Parchomovsky regard 
this as a more sophisticated version of the average reciprocity doctrine due 
to its ability to aggregate the total value of benefits and then offset it with the 
amount of taking compensation.  In contrast, the reciprocity of average 
doctrine is a binary all-or-nothing approach.323  Nevertheless, the U.S.’s 
benefit-offset principle suffers from the shortcoming that only the property 
owners of acquired property are being charged for the benefits.324  This has 
prevented the continued reception of the principle.325  
Singaporean scholars echo this deficiency as well.326  Nonetheless, 
while Singapore’s provisions do accord some unfairness in the relative 
aspect,327 it is worth noting that the doctrine is more sophisticated than the 
U.S. principle, which only offsets the benefits from the government’s 
acquisition actions.  The Singapore provisions exclude from the value of 
land any increases due to provision of public utilities and facilitates over the 
past seven years.  These are easily substantial physical and derivative 
givings that the U.S. principle failed to address.  
 
2. Formula One (F1) Street Race 
The land acquisition example is arguably a more passive form of 
charging givings since the “charge” is only imposed when the property or 
land is acquired.  A more direct form of charging a derivative giving is the 
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 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 23, at 598. 
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JANUARY 2010 CURBING RENT-SEEKING AND INEFFICIENCY 45 
  
a.  Background and Mechanics 
Singapore held the first ever night race in the sixty-year history of 
Formula One (“F1”) and was one of three street races in 2008.328  Singapore 
secured a five-year deal with an option for a five-year extension.329  The 
estimated annual cost of the Singapore F1 bid is S$150 million, with the 
Singapore government picking up 60% of the tab.330  The spillover benefits 
to Singapore’s economy (e.g., increased consumer or tourism spending) 
were very large; the government’s estimate of S$100 million per year was 
conservative in light of the S$150 million and S$200 million estimates by 
market analysts such as Citigroup.331  Other benefits included image 
promotion and free publicity to reach out to 500 million television viewers 
worldwide.332  One of the biggest and most direct beneficiaries was the hotel 
industry, which filled rooms even with rates easily double-to-triple the usual 
room rates.333  Given the street-race nature of the Singapore F1 races, the 
economical benefits to the hotels fortunate enough to be along the race route 
were even more enormous. 
In response, the government imposed a special F1 tax on hotel room 
revenue during the five days of the F1 race, with the trackside hotels having 
to pay a 30% tax while non-trackside hotels paid 20%.334  This was to defray 
the high cost of bringing the F1 to Singapore.335  The estimated revenue 
from this special tax is between S$15 million to S$20 million a year.336  The 
tax is levied because hotels in the area stand to gain significantly.337  The 
government allowed the hotels to set the actual price of the room.338  
Notwithstanding this high tax, hotel rooms filled quickly at significantly 
higher than normal room rates.339  
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b. “Giving” Characteristics  
The first interesting feature of this tax is that it justifiably 
discriminates between hotels that are trackside and hotels that are not.  This 
is well attuned to givings jurisprudence where the amount of charge imposed 
should commensurate with the benefits.  Second, the tax can be seen as an 
internalization of social benefits of a costly government project.  The 
Singapore government was asked whether the economic benefits of hosting 
this event outweighed the cost.340  An F1 race does not come cheap, with 
rights to hold the race costing up to US$40 million341 and requiring 
substantial support from the local governments.342  Yet the spillover benefits 
often outweighed the costs and direct benefits of these projects.  In Australia, 
the Australian Grand Prix results in a net loss of A$5 million to A$21 million 
a year for the operator, but is still socially beneficial because it adds up to 
A$174.8 million to the country’s coffers.343  By capturing a significant 
aspect of the otherwise external social benefits arising out of the project, the 
tax improved the financial viability of the project vis-à-vis the government’s 
financial perspective, ensuring this socially efficient project was not derailed 
because of government’s budgetary constraints.344  
VI. Merits of Singapore’s Givings Charging Regime  
The Singapore regime of actively charging for government benefits 
has provided a real-life application of the givings jurisprudence.  This 
Singaporean case study has not only confirmed the benefits of social 
efficiency and less rent-seeking but also injects new insights into how 
transaction costs implications reinforce the curtailing effect of charging 
givings on rent-seeking.  In addition, Singapore’s application illustrates how 
a regime of charging givings can produce other additional benefits not 
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envisaged by the current givings jurisprudence.  These include a healthier 
government fiscal budget and a more equitable taxation regime.  
A. Social Efficiency 
Singapore’s application of the giving jurisprudence promotes 
efficiency by internalizing the social benefits and utilizing efficient resource 
allocation mechanisms.  As discussed above,345 inefficiency is the likely 
result if the government fails to fully internalize the positive and negative 
externalities of its policy and actions.  Inefficiency is not averted even if all 
the social costs are fully internalized through compensation of takings 
victims since the social benefits are still not internalized.346  The outcome is 
the government operating under a fiscal illusion, resulting in distorted 
government incentives.347  This can also result in the failure to undertake 
socially beneficial projects.  
The special F1 tax348 is a clear example how the charging of a 
derivative giving allowed the Singaporean government to recover part of the 
substantial costs of a socially beneficial project.  Without the ability to 
recover a significant part of the costs from the parties most directly 
benefiting from the project, the Singaporean government may not be able to 
undertake such a costly project that has very substantial spillover social 
benefits.  Another example is the acquisition of the land for the North-East 
Line construction.349  By being able to recoup the enhanced land value 
arising from the substantial investment of taxpayer money, the government 
has more fiscal incentives to make such socially beneficial investments in 
the future. 
The emphasis on obtaining best value for the government when 
allocating valuable resources has also resulted in the adoption of allocation 
mechanisms that are more efficient.  U.S. scholars have called for more 
competitive mechanisms in government procurement in light of scandals 
from discretionary allocation of contracts.350  Open competitive tender is the 
norm in Singapore and selling government assets through direct private sale 
is frowned upon even if measures are taken to address the deficiencies.351  
The “responsibility” of the government to “obtain fair value for a scarce 
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resource” and to “collect the market price” has also driven the use of 
competitive market bidding in allocating valuable regulatory license such as 
the 3G licenses and vehicle permits.352  Pertinently, less efficient 
mechanisms like comparative hearings, queuing, and balloting were 
expressly rejected because of potential to grant of windfall profits to private 
parties under these mechanisms.353   
B. Public Choice:  Less Rent-seeking 
There is a huge potential for rent-seeking in scenarios such as the F1 
and the mass-transit construction.  The mere stroke on the drawing board in 
designating the route of the street track and the stations for the mass-transit 
line will bring an indirect but very substantial benefit to the surrounding 
property owners.  Given the obvious latitude and potential arbitrariness in 
such decisions (i.e., should the race route turn at this corner or the next 
corner?  Should the station be here or 400 meter down the road?), the risks 
and incentives for improper influence are certainly severe.  However, by 
imposing a fair charge which reduces the windfall (in the case of the F1) or 
removes the windfall (in the case of the North-East line), rent-seeking 
opportunities and the accompanying corruption are significantly curtailed.  
The same applies to zoning and regulatory permits, which have been a 
traditional hotbed of corruption.354 
Indeed, if the value of these rights to the private parties is significantly 
reduced by the imposition of fair charges, the curtailing effect on rent-
seeking behavior would be even more significant given the transaction costs 
inherent in rent-seeking.  Corrupt transactions are essentially similar to other 
economically based interactions and are based on the exchange of specific 
bundles of property rights.  These transactions face the same problems of 
transaction costs.355  With the imposition of fair charges and the transaction 
costs of rent-seeking, there is a good chance that rent-seeking activities may 
be priced out.  This is especially so given that costs have to be incurred to 
keep bribes and dubious campaign contributions secret.356 
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Moreover, the reality of administrative costs means that an emphasis 
on charging givings is more effective than compensating takings to reduce 
rent-seeking behavior.  Administrative costs have to be incurred to determine 
the amount of compensation to be paid or the charge to be collected.  There 
are also costs in payment of compensation and collection of charges.  Hence, 
compensation is usually only paid out for larger takings while charges, if 
imposed, will usually be on substantial givings.  This means that focusing on 
compensating takings is disproportionately detrimental to small owners 
since the value of acquired property may not outweigh the potentially hefty 
cost in seeking redress.  This will result in many small takings and 
diminutions of property being uncompensated and un-redressed.  On the 
other hand, influential interest groups and the rich or powerful benefit 
disproportionately under such regimes because of their ability to argue for 
higher compensation357 or simply seek to block the takings altogether.358   
The converse is true for givings.  Small owners stand to gain in a 
regime which charges givings since the administrative costs would likely 
preclude charging of small benefits.  Instead, recipients of big benefits will 
be disproportionately targeted for the charge.  In this Singapore case study, 
the government beneficiaries being charged are generally the upper class of 
society who have significant wealth and resources, such as owners of 
downtown hotels (F1 tax), landed property owners (North-East Line),359 car 
owners (COE) and telecommunication companies (spectrum right auction).  
If the charge is excessive or unfair, these are private parties who are able to 
either fight back or simply move away from Singapore.  More importantly, 
these are the groups that are most likely and most well placed to rent-seek 
for potential benefits in the first place.  Now having made to bear the costs 
of these projects, they would be more careful when lobbying for those 
projects and benefits.360 
C. Healthier Fiscal Budget 
Charging of government benefits allows the government to have a 
bigger budget.  The Singapore government operates consistently under a 
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budget surplus.  The budget surplus for 2007 was S$6.4 billion.361  In fact, 
prior to 2001, year after year of primary budget surpluses supplied by the 
government’s revenue from taxes, fees, and charges were sufficient to 
support total public spending.362  Budget surpluses averaged 2.4% of gross 
domestic product (“GDP”) from 1996 to 2000.363  Earlier, budget surpluses 
averaged about 6% of GDP from 1991 to 1995 and 2-3% in 1996 to 1997 
without even including investment income, net lending, and net capital 
receipts (such as land sales).364  Unlike in the U.S.,365 the amount of 
government fees and charges collected are significant in comparison with 
revenue from general taxes and is one of the key components to these budget 
surpluses.366 
Furthermore, the giving rationales and policies contribute to a healthy 
fiscal budget in other ways.  First, government expenditure is conserved with 
stringent government procurement procedures driven by the compulsion for 
maximum value to the government.367  Second, the overall government 
policy and practice of recouping any windfall gains to private parties 
accrued through government actions helps curtail rent-seeking activities in 
general.  This not only further reduces government expenditures and 
activities aimed at benefiting interest groups but it also ensures a more 
efficient regulatory regime368 that promotes general public welfare and 
enhances the tax bases of general taxes.  
There are many benefits to having a healthy budget.  For starters, the 
government is able to focus more on good governance than money.  Faced 
with a dwindling budget, U.S. local governments have integrated land use 
planning and zoning efforts with municipal financial planning goals, which 
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has resulted in “regulate for revenue.”369  Similarly, “all Americans pay for 
the negative effect[s] on the value of the dollar and the national economy” as 
government deficit spending increases.370  On the other hand, the consistent 
budgetary surpluses allow Singapore to build up a huge reserve.371  This has 
enabled Singapore to distribute a massive economic stimulus program in 
response to the current economic recession.  It is telling that while the 
Singapore’s stimulus package is proportionally larger than stimulus 
packages in most other nations, it has been financed by simply withdrawing 
from the national reserve instead of incurring huge deficit spending and 
government debts commonly relied upon by many other countries, including 
the U.S.372 
Moreover, empirical studies show that public spending is an important 
determinant of rights protection and enforcement.373  The studies suggest 
that there is an association between a variety of rights indicators and 
government spending.374  Property rights and equality before the law are also 
found to be stronger in countries with lower budget deficits.375  A healthy 
budget allows Singapore to provide its civil servants with a wage premium 
above private sector salaries.  Singapore pays its government officials and 
civil servants high salaries compared with equivalent salaries in the private 
sector.376  In particular, ministers are benchmarked against top-earners from 
corporate executive officers (“CEOs”) of listed companies and other 
professions.377  This helps decrease corruption, as per the efficiency wage 
                                           
369
  Rosenberg, supra note 254, at 183; Charles, supra note 269, at 1-5; EAGLE, supra note 1, at 424 
(also known as fiscal zoning, where land use policies is used by local government to increase tax collection 
or reduce likely expenditures). 
370
  MALLOY, supra note 149, at 58; see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY 
RETURNS 19 (2008) (The deficits are ultimately borne by future generations with accrued interest). 
371
  The official foreign reserves is over $250 billion with that figure excluding investment and assets 
portfolios managed by the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation and Temasek Holdings.  
Anna Teo, Economists Favour Firing Reserves Ammo, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 20, 2009. This is 
certainly a sizeable sum for a population of just over 4 million.  2007 YEARBOOK OF STATISTICS 
SINGAPORE, supra note 60, at 9. 
372
  Sue-Ann Chia, Budget Aim: Biggest Bang for the Buck, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Feb. 6, 2009; 
Hussain, supra note 27 (The Singapore stimulus budget is 8% of the GDP., while the U.S. budget is 
approximately 6%, Germany approximately 1%, and Taiwan approximately 4% over 4 years). 
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  Luiz de Mello & Randa Sab, Government Spending, Rights, and Civil Liberties, 22 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 257, 273 (2002). 
374
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  Id. at 274. 
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  Sue-Ann Chia, For Reality Check, Compare Their Pay With That of Bosses, STRAITS TIMES 
(Sing.), Apr. 12, 2007; Lydia Lim, Top Govt Salaries Far Behind Private Sector’s, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), 
Mar. 23, 2007; Govt Pay Boost for 65,000, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Dec. 4, 1993, at 1. 
377
  Chia, supra note 372; Lim, supra note 376. 
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theory.378  Indeed, the high salaries of political leaders and public officials 
are credited with contributing to the lack of corruption in Singapore.379  In 
contrast, Indonesia’s very low government salaries encourage rent-
seeking.380  In the U.K., legislators receive token salaries and often end up 
taking jobs as paid lobbyists for companies and other commercial 
organizations.381  U.S. Senators, Congressman, and senior officials often 
make up for their low public sector wages during term times by utilizing 
their contacts and public service for lobbying purposes.382  Paying high 
salaries is certainly preferable to allowing rent-seeking and corruption as a 
supplementary compensation scheme for low government salaries.383 
D. More Equitable Taxation Regime 
It is telling that the healthy budget surplus, which the Singapore 
government enjoys, is obtained while having one of the world’s lowest 
income and corporate tax rates, especially compared with the U.S. and 
European countries.384   The Singapore tax rate is low:  The maximum tax 
rate is 20% for income exceeding $320,000.385  Since reform in 1994, 71% 
of individuals no longer pay income tax.386  This is much less than the one-
third figure in U.S.387  In 2007, Singapore’s corporate tax rate was reduced 
from 20% to 18%.388  Prior to the reduction, Singapore’s statutory corporate 
tax rate of 20% was the third lowest in the region and the eighteenth lowest 
worldwide.389  To put those figures into perspective, the top marginal 
personal income tax and corporate tax rates in the U.S. are both 35%.390  
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 Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, XXXV J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1320, 1339 (1997). 
379
 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, COUNTRY STUDY REP., supra note 201, at 12. 
380
 Andrew White, Esq, The Paradox of Corruption as Antithesis to Economic Development: Does 
Corruption Undermine Economic Development in Indonesia and China and Why are the Experiences 
Different in Each Country?, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 10 (2006). 
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 White, supra note 380, at 17. 
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 AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 365, at 162-64 (The maximum marginal rate of European nations is 
typically 40-50%). 
385
 Income Tax Act, Cap. 134 (2004 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.), Second Schedule Part A. 
386
 Staying Ahead with Guts, Gumption and Enterprise, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Mar. 2, 1995, at 6. 
387
 KLEIN, supra note 365, at 1. 
388
 Annual Budget Statement, 2008, Parliament No. 11 Hansard (Sing.) 15 Feb. 2008, Col 365 
(testimony of Second Minister for Finance, Tharman Shanmugaratnam). 
389
 News of Corporate Tax Rate Cut Welcomed, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 21, 2007. 
390
 26 U.S.C.A. §1, §1(i)(2), §11.  See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 365 at 139-140 (reduced from 
39.6% to 35% in 2003).  However, the tax rate is set to increase back to 39.6% in the near future: John D. 
Mckinnon & Tom Herman, The Wealthy Lose Out as Many Others Gain, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at 
A8; Laura D'Andrea Tyson, In Defense of Obamanomics, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2009, at A19. 
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Tax is often viewed simply as a revenue-producing devise, but it is in 
fact one of the far-reaching powers of the government, which can impose 
real costs on private property rights.391  Scholars have considered taxing as a 
form of eminent domain and have even argued that some tax laws are 
actually unconstitutional takings.392  Broadly based taxes, like income tax 
and corporate tax, do not treat all taxpayers fairly, because they benefit some 
citizens at the expense of others.393  Tax laws are subjected to intense 
lobbying pressures, which result in provisions catering to the lobbying 
interest groups at the expense of general taxpayers.394  Indeed, a system that 
strongly protects individual property rights will not only require 
compensation when an individual’s property is taken or burdened for the 
public good, but will also minimize the use of broadly based taxes.395  
On the other hand, by ensuring that the government beneficiaries pay 
the appropriate charges, whether through the benefits-offsetting in land 
acquisition, development charges, COE, or the F1 special tax, the Singapore 
government has a more equitable form of taxation that is both progressive 
and minimizes the use of broadly based taxes.  The Singapore government 
has acknowledged that government receipts from regulations, while 
collected for reasons other than revenue, have enabled the government to 
keep other taxes low.396  The practice of the government is to charge realistic 
fees for government services so as to avoid the ever-increasing subsidies on 
public services.397  This prevents the need for extraordinarily high taxes to 
compensate, as in many developed countries, and allows Singapore to keep 
total taxes, fees and other charges collected from its population at one of the 
lowest rates in the world.398  Thus, the government need not draw as heavily 
on the broadly based taxes when undertaking socially beneficial projects like 
public infrastructure.399  
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 Socially beneficial projects include the North East Line, the COE, and the F1 races. 
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VII. Moving Forward: Implementing Givings  
Part VI vividly illustrates how the Singapore givings charging regime 
has not only helped promote efficiency and constrain rent-seeking, but has 
also enabled a healthy fiscal position coupled with equitable taxation.  The 
question then is how to translate this givings jurisprudence into meaningful 
implementation and reform.  The Singapore regime is far from perfect.  In 
particular, the lack of legal restraints and enforcement mechanisms renders 
the givings practice and policies susceptible to the prevailing political 
climate.  This part proposes a framework for givings reform that addresses 
this deficiency, together with other important issues. 
A. Deficiencies of the Singapore Regime 
The givings rationale resonates frequently in the Singapore 
government’s decision making .400  However, it is still only a policy to which 
the Singapore government voluntarily subscribes.  If there is a change of the 
ruling party, or simply a policy reversal, a Pandora’s box of vices and abuses 
may well be opened.  Indeed, there have been subtle changes in government 
policies over the years.  The government has somewhat decreased its 
emphasis on windfalls from development permits in justifying development 
charges.401  The Land Acquisition Act has also been amended so that there is 
no longer a “charge” for derivative givings in the form of provisions for 
public utilities and facilities.402  These changes are not per se undesirable,403 
but they do highlight the delicate nature of the givings policies in Singapore. 
Closely related is the lack of enforcement mechanisms.  Auditing by 
the Singapore government auditing body has proven rather effective404 but 
nevertheless suffers from the inherent limitations of being public 
enforcement.405  Moreover, the Auditor-General’s powers are limited to 
reporting the findings and recommending follow-up.  The Auditor-General 
                                           
400
  See generally supra Part V. 
401
  See supra Part V.B.1.b. 
402
  Land Acquisition Act, c. 152, §§  33(5)(a), (c) (1985) (amended 2007) (Sing.). 
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  The reason for abolishing the discounting of the increase in value for public investment is because 
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(Amendment) Bill, 2007, supra note 53, at Col 500 (Deputy Prime Minister and Minster for Law, Prof. S 
Jayakumar). 
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  See supra Part V.A.1. 
405
  Public enforcement suffers from possible bureaucratic inefficiency and inadequate resources. They 
may be subjected to corruption and political pressure.  see Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial 
Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case, in AFTER ENRON–IMPROVING 
CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNIZING SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE US 159, 195-96 (John 
Armour & Joseph A McCahery ed., 2006).  
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does not have legal power to pursue irregularities.406  Except for the case of 
government tender, where rival bidders have the power and incentive to 
enforce any non-compliance of the government policies,407 there are no 
external enforcement mechanisms for other givings.  The givings policies 
and practices are essentially promulgated and enforced simply by the 
political will of the ruling party.408 
This severe lack of checks and balances renders the givings practice 
extremely susceptible to the prevailing political climate.  Any government 
policy is subjected to the influence and distortion of the various political 
actors.  Interest groups have strong incentives and the leverage to distort, for 
their own benefit, government processes aimed at enhancing government 
efficiency.409  In the U.S., the imposition and assessment of user fees (a form 
of charging for givings) are often determined by the political process instead 
of a genuine attempt on internalizing the costs and benefits.410  Many of the 
charges that best reflected the benefits of economics efficiency ironically 
were the ones with the most political resistance.411  Bureaucrats also have 
perverse incentives to oppose the imposition of user charges since doing so 
may result in a decrease in demand for the bureau service and consequently 
the bureau’s budget.412  Moreover, while user fees are a more attractive fiscal 
tool than new taxes from the perspective of vote-maximizing politicians, 
“more attractive still is the idea of a ‘free lunch’:  providing voters with 
benefits in cases where the cost of those benefits is sufficiently small to hide 
elsewhere in the federal budget.”413  All this jousting by various political 
actors can seriously undermine effective implementation of givings reforms. 
Indeed, the query then is how Singapore has managed to maintain its 
givings policies for over forty years since independence.  This is likely due 
to the fact that “post-Independence Singapore has not experienced political 
turnover nor is this prospect reasonably foreseeable, given the ineffectual 
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parliamentary opposition, holding two of 84 elective seats.”414  While there 
are qualms as to whether this political dominance is entrenched through 
undemocratic and authoritarian measures,415 the lack of immediate risk of 
political turnover does help facilitate greater discipline and more long-term 
perspective in relation to fiscal policies.  The reasonable security of political 
tenure means the government has less incentive to overspend in the current 
term or engage in popular but fiscally damaging tax cuts.416  Similarly, the 
government is more likely to engage in tax reforms that may be unpopular 
but essential to long-term fiscal health.417  After all, the same government 
will face the full effects of its fiscal policies, whether it is a healthy surplus 
or a crushing deficit.  This political dominance may also help curtail the 
rent-seeking activities of interest groups since the ruling party is much less 
dependent upon interest groups’ campaign contributions and votes. 
Nonetheless, the political will of the current government in itself is 
certainly not a reliable premise for implementing givings reform, especially 
since there are limited checks against any sudden reversal of the policy.  
Moreover, such political dominance is more the exception than the norm.  
Any givings reform must adequately address the issues of legal restraints 
and enforcement mechanisms. 
B. Framework for Implementing Givings Reform 
Actual reform on particular government practices and policies 
requires careful examination of socio-economic conditions and 
corresponding legal framework.  These scenario-specific considerations 
include the administrative costs in benefits and charges collection, behavior 
modifications induced by the charges, the desirable magnitude of the 
charges, redistributive considerations, and relationships with existing takings 
law.  It is impossible to articulate a concrete workable reform proposal 
without full analysis of these scenario-specific considerations from each 
                                           
414
 Thio Li-ann, The Right to Political Participation in Singapore: Tailor-Making a Westminster-
Modelled Constitution to Fit the Imperatives of ‘Asian’ Democracy, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 181, 183 
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particular practice.  This is beyond the scope of this paper.  Nonetheless, this 
section proposes a framework for implementing givings reform that 
addresses the pertinent issues that are common and essential to any effective 
givings reform. 
1. Legal Restrains and Enforcement Mechanisms  
Proper legal constraints and enforcement mechanisms are necessary to 
ensure the benefits of givings reform materialize in practice.  The U.K. 
provides a good example of the effectiveness of legal constraints in givings.  
The U.K. restrictions on bestowing of benefits to private parties by local 
government arose out of the anti-competition concerns.418  These restrictions 
are enforced by competitors who are harmed by the bestowing of benefits to 
another competitor.  While not motivated by givings jurisprudence or 
concerns for individual rights threatened by eminent domain, these restraints 
have sufficient legal bite and means of enforcement to help “control some of 
the excesses that have been so controversial in the United States.”419  
However, givings scenarios, where there is an identifiable victim who 
suffered substantial detriment, is more the exception than the norm.420  As 
alluded to above,421 givings are especially susceptible to rent-seeking 
because the benefit is concentrated in the hands of a few while the cost is 
spread out thinly over a large number of people.  Relying upon a party 
harmed by the giving to oppose the giving will render most givings 
undetected and unopposed in most scenarios.  
Hence, any reform should impose legal restraints coupled with 
effective enforcement mechanisms.  In addition to parties harmed by such 
givings, a possible solution to enforcement is to rely on non-profit 
organizations (“NPOs”).  Striking down a government’s action for 
unjustified givings is a public good since the benefits—mainly a reduction in 
corruption and reimbursement of public coffer—are enjoyed by all 
taxpayers.  NPOs can be seen as a response to government and market 
failures in the supply of public goods.422  The non-distribution constraint of 
NPOs may also make them a more trustworthy producer of public goods 
                                           
418
 Allen, supra note 184, at 90 (both competition between the various local governments and 




 Another possible example is the common economic development eminent domain where the 
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than for-profit firms.423  Another approach is to grant an incentive award to 
private parties who have successfully struck down an unjustified giving.  
This can energize private enforcement to complement public enforcement.  
Nonetheless, the incentive award must be carefully tailored to prevent over-
enforcement and the consequential social costs.424 
2. Evaluating the Quantum of the Charges 
Should the charges be assessed based on the value of the benefits 
received or the cost to the government?  In the context of user fees, 
economists opine that efficiency requires the fee to correspond with the 
marginal cost to the government in providing that benefit.425  This will 
provide the proper incentive for optimal consumption of government 
benefits.426  On the other hand, Singapore’s givings regime tends to focus on 
the value of benefits to recipients in calculating the charge.  The charges in 
development charges—including 3G licenses, COE and discounting in 
acquisition—are premised on the value of the government benefits.  
Accessing the value of public benefits is difficult since much of it is 
subjective.427  An accurate assessment of the benefits usually requires the 
existence of a competitive market.  This can be done through competitive 
biddings of the benefits (e.g., 3G licenses or COE) or valuation using a 
comparative market (e.g., development charges, discounting during 
acquisition).  Evaluation of benefits will be difficult and ambiguous in 
situations without such a market.  For example, the benefits may be unique 
or may have only one potential recipient.  The government may also enjoy a 
monopoly in the production of those benefits, as with regulatory permits. 428  
Applying a charge in these types of monopolies may artificially drive up 
prices.429  On the other hand, while the cost approach provides a direct and 
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more straight-forward evaluation mechanism, it is not applicable where the 
government  incurs little or no costs, as with various lucrative regulatory 
permits.     
However, every givings involves an allocation of government 
resources.  The benefits approach promotes a more efficient allocation of 
resources.  The benefits approach ensures that benefits are allocated based 
on their value to recipients.  This ensures utilization of resources by those 
who value them the most.  Moreover, there is much less room for rent-
seeking, which can distort an otherwise efficient allocation of resources.  By 
basing charges on the value of the benefits, rent is either significantly 
reduced430 or eliminated.431   
The efficiency and rent-seeking rationale is particularly pertinent for 
government benefits that cost the government very little, such as regulatory 
permits.  Charging for these benefits on the minimal government costs will 
result in inefficient allocation mechanisms based on either queuing, balloting 
or government discretion.  Resources are not given to those who valued 
them the most under queuing and balloting, while there are significant rent-
seeking and administrative costs associated with government discretion.  
The costs approach also fails to guarantee efficient consumption of 
government services when there are negative externalities not reflected in 
the government’s cost.  
On balance, the benefits approach should be the primary basis for 
evaluating the amount of charges in most givings reforms.  The costs 
approach may be useful in situations where the government costs are easily 
ascertainable but the benefits are difficult to access.  
3. Requirement of Public Use or Public Purpose? 
The more difficult issue is whether government givings must be 
subjected to a “public use” or a “public purpose” requirement, as in the case 
for takings.  The notion that the government can bestow a benefit upon a 
private party without a corresponding public purpose seems untenable.  Yet 
not all givings should be charged, even if a private party has clearly 
benefited.  If the government has to impose a fair charge on every givings, 
the government will not be able to allocate resources for redistributive 
purposes.432 
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This paper proposes that there should be a requirement of “public 
purpose.”  “[O]btaining the maximum value for the government’s 
benefits/resources/assets” will be sufficient evidence that this “public 
purpose” is satisfied.  The efficiency in allocating and bolstering public 
coffers is clearly a legitimate government purpose.  Beyond this, the 
government must show that granting of benefits serves some important 
public purpose, such as income distribution, special incentives, etc.  It is 
acknowledged that like the “public use” doctrine in takings law, ambiguity 
and controversy in the interpretation of this requirement is inevitable.  
Nonetheless, this requirement will still go some way towards reducing rent-
seeking by attracting more public attention on such givings, which can often 
go unnoticed.433  Under a legally enforceable framework with effective 
enforcement mechanisms as identified above,434 the “public purpose” 
requirement would force the government to justify bestowing benefits to 
private parties, promoting transparency and encouraging public scrutiny.  
When formulating the givings jurisprudence, Bell and Parchomovsky 
omit the “public use” requirement in their analytical framework.435  This is 
perhaps not surprising, since they are not big fans of the “public use” 
doctrine for takings.436  Another reason is that their framework envisages the 
benefits to be only charged upon voluntarily acceptance by the beneficiaries, 
rendering it more as a contractual transaction.437  Yet this 
voluntary/involuntary categorization can be more illusionary than real, 
especially when there are no practical alternatives to the government 
benefits.438  Moreover, this contractual approach may encounter holdout 
problems.439  For example, if, under the F1 street race tax, ten percent of the 
hotels objected to the tax and the F1 street race while the other 90% were 
willing to be subjected to the tax in exchange for the benefits of the F1 street 
race,440 should the government proceed with the projects and the tax?  Thus, 
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the more effective approach is to incorporate the “public use”/“public 
purpose” discourse with givings as with takings, but noting that unlike 
takings, where there has to be public use and just compensation, a fair 
charge is possibly sufficient for givings.  This allows redistributive welfare 
consideration to legitimately enter the legal discourse while acknowledging 
the inevitable compulsion in some instances of givings. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
Conventional discourses on the perils of weak property rights vis-à-
vis government takings have failed to provide an adequate account and 
response to the rent-seeking and inefficiency problems of government 
actions.  This case study of Singapore from a givings perspective has 
demonstrated the importance of imposing a fair charge on the various kinds 
of givings in curbing rent-seeking and inefficiency. It is also worth noting 
the additional benefits of Singapore’s healthy fiscal budget and more 
equitable taxation.  While not discounting the importance of property rights 
protection, this paper provides a timely reminder to conventional U.S. 
scholarship that the givings aspects of the equation cannot be ignored.  
The proposed framework on implementing givings reform is 
particularly important and timely as some of the largest ever givings unfold 
through various massive government economic stimulus programs.441  The 
Obama administration has signaled the political will to cut waste and ensure 
that taxpayer money is well spent.442  But given the huge potential for rent-
seeking,443 the legal restraints and effective enforcement mechanisms 
articulated in the proposed framework is pertinent to ensure the contracts 
under the various spending programs444 are efficiently and competitively 
allocated.  Other than the rival bidders which are harmed by dubious awards 
of contract, the laws could possibly allow citizen watch groups to enforce 
non-compliance with procurement procedures and the principle that the 
government is getting the maximum value.  Indeed, given this gargantuan 
expenditure of taxpayer money in stimulus packages, the last thing needed is 
for rent-seeking and inefficiency to mar this grandest of government givings. 
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